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#### TOPICALITY:

#### Interpretation: the 1AC must propose and defend an instance of topical action.

#### The “federal government” means the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)\>

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of state action.

#### Two impacts:

#### First---FAIRNESS. Non-topical advocacies allow the aff to unilaterally determine negative positions and create an incentive to minimize viable contestation. Debate’s a game---competition precedes pedagogy because it’s a procedural question.

#### Second---CLASH. Open-ended topics make focused research, testing, and innovation impossible. Non-topical advocacies are impossible to predict, which is the foundation of argument interaction. The repetition of limited arguments over the course of a season fosters iterative education and teaches debaters how to anatomize power. Prioritize debate’s potential to forge a techne of argumentative refinement because that’s its only unique benefit.

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#### CLIMATE PIC:

#### Counter-advocacy: abolish the epistemic rule of reason and non-profit the United States, except business actions and entities that significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

#### The plan derails burgeoning corporate action to curb emissions.

Balmer 20, JD, associate in Tonkon Torp’s Litigation Department, former Senior Articles Editor of Ecology Law Quarterly. (Paul, 7-27-2020, "Colluding to Save the World: How Antitrust Laws Discourage Corporations from Taking Action on Climate Change", *Ecology Law Quarterly*, <https://www.ecologylawquarterly.org/currents/colluding-to-save-the-world-how-antitrust-laws-discourage-corporations-from-taking-action-on-climate-change/>)

This debate about the goals of our antitrust laws emerges at a critical inflection point in competition law and corporation law generally. Corporations have emerged as powerful voices for social and political change, flexing lobbying muscle and changing their own behaviors to create policy impact on issues like gun control, anti-discrimination protection, and climate change. This increased action has led to formal acknowledgement that shareholder profit need not be the driving force of corporate decision making, reversing decades of focus on shareholder primacy.[3] At the same time, a growing body of literature critiques antitrust enforcement as being limited to too narrow a lens.[4] By focusing primarily on consumer welfare—as measured by prices—antitrust regulators ignore both broader, less tangible harms to society and also potential societal benefits that might flow from anticompetitive behavior.

Our antitrust laws must evolve to reflect the changing nature of corporate purpose and corporate social activism. Courts should not so quickly disregard the beneficial goals of business coordination, especially when those goals align with global commitments to address climate change. If our antitrust framework does not change, two types of conduct could be chilled. First, companies could be discouraged from coordinating with competitors to meet sustainability goals, like carbon emissions targets. This type of corporate collaboration on sustainability could be considered either an illegal agreement to fix prices or output. Second, a group of competitors refusing to work with a more polluting competitor could be considered an illegal group boycott. Further, and beyond the scope of this Article, companies with monopoly power could be discouraged from adopting “greener” practices if those commitments have the end result of raising consumer prices or increasing the costs of market entry for competitors.

#### Corporate leadership is key to stop existential warming.

Balmer 20, JD, associate in Tonkon Torp’s Litigation Department, former Senior Articles Editor of Ecology Law Quarterly. (Paul, 7-27-2020, "Colluding to Save the World: How Antitrust Laws Discourage Corporations from Taking Action on Climate Change", *Ecology Law Quarterly*, <https://www.ecologylawquarterly.org/currents/colluding-to-save-the-world-how-antitrust-laws-discourage-corporations-from-taking-action-on-climate-change/>)

The growth of corporate activism can be traced to broader societal changes, such as the increased connectivity of people and markets in the Internet age.[19] At the same time, governmental gridlock and increasing political polarization have undermined the capacity of government institutions to function efficiently and greatly weakened public trust in government.[20] Corporations are filling this gap as traditional government services become increasingly privatized.[21] The growing corporate role in society has fed on itself, with increased stakes and visibility of corporate activism resulting in outsized political power and legal rights. Corporate-associated spending on politics has reached unprecedented, jaw-dropping levels.[22]

It is increasingly clear that America cannot address the existential reality of climate change without corporate buy-in, if not corporate leadership. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the extent of the climate crisis or the necessary corporate response; it is enough to say that each passing week brings bad news about the extent of already irreversible damage from climate change.[23]

While the future costs of climate change will be immense, the costs of acting now to limit warming to habitable levels are also significant, on the measure of $3.5 trillion a year.[24] While governments around the world are expected to lead the necessary spending, a large portion of those costs will inevitably fall on companies, either through direct taxes like a carbon tax or increased costs of compliance, such as ending reliance on coal.[25] Even as global governmental efforts falter,[26] corporations are committing to act, both together[27] and independently.[28] The high costs of corporate climate engagement, both to the companies themselves and to our society,[29] have to be worth the last best chance to mitigate catastrophic climate change.

#### Global nuclear war.

Klare 20, PhD, MA, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. (Michael T., 1-13-2020, “How Rising Temperatures Increase the Likelihood of Nuclear War”, *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/nuclear-defense-climate-change/>)

All things being equal, rising temperatures will increase the likelihood of nuclear war, largely because climate change will heighten the risk of social stress, the decay of nation-states, and armed violence in general, as I argue in my new book, All Hell Breaking Loose. As food and water supplies dwindle and governments come under ever-increasing pressure to meet the vital needs of their populations, disputes over critical resources are likely to become more heated and violent, whether the parties involved have nuclear arms or not. But this danger is compounded by the possibility that several nuclear-armed powers—notably India, Pakistan, and China—will break apart as a result of climate change and accompanying battles over disputed supplies of water.

Together, these three countries are projected by the UN Population Division to number approximately 3.4 billion people in 2050, or 34 percent of the world’s population. Yet they possess a much smaller share of the world’s freshwater supplies, and climate change is destined to reduce what they have even further. Warmer temperatures are also expected to diminish crop yields in these countries, adding to the desperation of farmers and very likely resulting in widespread ethnic strife and population displacement. Under these circumstances, climate-related internal turmoil would increase the risk of nuclear war in two ways: by enabling the capture of nuclear arms by rogue elements of the military and their possible use against perceived enemies and by inciting wars between these states over vital supplies of water and other critical resources.

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#### CAPITALISM DA:

#### 1. Cap solves interdependence and transition conflicts. Great-power war.

Drezner 16, PhD, professor of international politics @ Tufts, nonresident senior fellow @ Brookings (Daniel, May 2016, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy”, *Brookings*, pg. 15-16, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IOS-Drezner-web.pdf>)

Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital.

Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place.

#### 2. Transition wars---turns environment quicky.

Smith 19, assistant professor of finance @ Stony Brook University (Noah, April 5th, “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism>, Accessed: 07-15-19)

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.

#### 3. Food---the aff would immediately starve 80% of humanity.

Harvey 19 (David, British-born Marxist economic geographer, podcaster and Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He received his PhD in geography from the University of Cambridge, “Anti-Capitalist Chronicles: Global Unrest,” 19 December 2019, <https://www.democracyatwork.info/acc_global_unrest>, DOA: 11-20-2021)

So that is, if you like, one half of the problem. But the other part of the problem is this: that in Marx's time if there was a sudden collapse of capitalism, most people in the world would be able to feed themselves and reproduce. Because most people were self-sufficient in their local area with the kinds of, you know, things they needed to live on – in other words, people could put breakfast on their table irrespective of what was going on in the global economy. Right now that's no longer the case. Most people in the United States, but increasingly, of course, in Europe, and in Japan, and now increasingly in China, and India, and Indonesia, and everywhere are dependent entirely upon the delivery of food to them, so that they get the food from the circulation of capital. Now, in Marx's time, like I say, that would have not been true but now this is a situation where probably around 70 or maybe 80 percent of the world's people are dependent upon the circulation of capital in order to assure their food supply, in order to deliver them the kinds of fuels which are going to allow them mobility, going to actually deliver them all the necessities to be able to reproduce their daily life.

So this is a, I think, a situation which I can really summarize in the following kind of way: that capital right now is too big to fail. We cannot imagine a situation where we would shut down the flow of capital, because if we shut down the flow of capital, 80 percent of the world's population would immediately starve, would be rendered immobile, would not be able to reproduce themselves in very effective ways. So we cannot afford any kind of sustained attack upon capital accumulation. So the kind of fantasy that you might have had – socialists, or communists, and so on, might have had back in 1850, which is that well, okay, we can destroy this capitalist system and we can build something entirely different – that is an impossibility right now. We have to keep the circulation of capital in motion, we have to keep things moving, because if we don't do that, we are actually stuck with a situation in which, as I've said, almost all of us would starve.

## CASE

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#### 3---economic relationality is inevitable and good.

Fleming and Banerjee, 16—Professor of Business and Society and Director of the Modular Executive MBA programme AND Professor of Management and Director of the Executive PhD program at Cass Business School, City University London (Peter and Subhabrata Bobby, “When performativity fails: Implications for Critical Management Studies,” human relations, 2016, Vol. 69(2), 257–276, dml)

In their influential analysis of Critical Management Studies (CMS), Fournier and Grey (2000) argue that CMS scholarship is driven by three basic principles: denaturalization, reflectivity and non-performativity. Denaturalization deconstructs the seemingly immutable ‘realities’ and ‘rationalities’ of managerialism while exposing the wealth of alternatives that reside in the shadows of organizational life. Reflectivity challenges the dominance of positivism in the methodologies of mainstream management research, revealing how all social scientific investigation is underpinned by political assumptions. Drawing on Lyotard’s (1984) notion of instrumental performativity, the principle of nonperformativity rejects the means-ends rationality that governs many organizational situations, especially under neoliberal capitalism characterized by a brazen cost-minimization/ profit-maximization logic (Fournier and Grey, 2000).

The principle of non-performativity has recently been questioned in a number of articles published in this journal and elsewhere. These authors suggest that by critically distancing themselves from the concrete activities of managers, researchers may miss opportunities to intervene and make a difference for the better. For example, in their influential article, Spicer et al. (2009: 538) argue that the principle of non-performativity needlessly isolates CMS from organizational practitioners. This in turn fosters a corrosive ‘cynicism and negativism’ whereby scholars ply grand critical theories that have little relevance to everyday organizational challenges. Others similarly maintain that the principle of non-performativity fails to offer ‘practical’ guidelines for managers (King and Learmonth, 2014); misses crucial opportunities to ‘collaborate’ with middle-managers and stubbornly objects to becoming ‘more relevant to practice’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 7); is elitist in how it ignores practitioner management texts in favour of ‘canonical perspectives’ associated with Marx, Foucault and the Frankfurt School (Hartmann, 2014: 619, also see Clegg et al., 2006).

These scholars recommend a renewed commitment to performativity so that critical knowledge can have an impact on the practices of managers and lead to emancipatory change. Most assertive in this regard are Spicer et al. (2009) and Wickert and Schaefer (2014) and their respective notions of critical performativity and progressive performativity. Both articles draw upon wider philosophical studies of performativity to discern its potential for CMS researchers hoping to make meaningful interventions. In particular, they apply Austin (1963) and Butler’s (1990, 1993) influential insight about the way language creates reality (rather than just describe it). Armed with this insight, it is claimed that CMS researchers can change organizational practice (for the better) by altering how language is used by managers. Modified speech may lead to modified and thus emancipatory behaviour. Such critical performativity ‘involves active and subversive intervention into managerial discourses and practices’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 538). Instead of worrying about emancipation on a grand scale, more modest microemancipatory practices might ‘stimulate the performative effects of language in order to induce incremental, rather than radical, changes in managerial behaviour’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 1). This means getting closer to managers rather than critiquing them from afar.

We agree that CMS scholars should be reflecting on how their critical findings might translate into concrete change. Otherwise why bother being critical in the first place? Moreover, we applaud recent efforts – including the advocates of critical and progressive performativity – to rethink how CMS research might make a difference to organizational practices. Our motivation for entering this discussion, however, derives from a nagging doubt. We are concerned that the emphasis on discursive performativity as a change mechanism risks presenting an overly optimistic view of (a) the power of language to alter institutionalized organizational practices associated with neoliberal capitalism and (b) the capability of CMS scholars alone to reorder in situ how managers make sense of governing imperatives like profit-maximization, shareholder value, consumer responsiveness and so forth. While there may be situations in which critical and/ or progressive performativity may ‘talk into existence new (counterbalancing) behaviours and practices’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 3), we also propose that, realistically speaking, such attempts would just as likely fail given the preponderant pressures of economic rationality in many business contexts. Missing in the aforementioned calls for a wider appreciation of (discursive) performativity, therefore, are the strict boundary conditions that Austin (1963) and Butler (1990, 1993, 2010) themselves place around the notion.

Our article contributes to the ongoing discussion about the challenge of making CMS performative by addressing two central questions. First, rather than automatically assume their success, how might discursive performative approaches (such as critical and progressive performativity) fail to enact desired material changes and for what reasons? Answering this question will provide a better understanding of the practical contingencies that can determine whether these new performativities are the best method for endeavouring to influence organizations. Second, in light of the constraints on the performative potential of language, what other possible avenues are available to the CMS community for having an impact (however modest) on organizational practices and routines?

The article is structured in four parts. First, we provide an overview of the founding CMS principle of non-performativity and analyse recent calls for critical research to become more performative, giving particular attention to the two articles that have recently appeared in this journal. Second, we identify the circumstances under which it is more realistic to expect discursive performativity to fail rather than succeed. Corporate Social Responsibility (or CSR) is here highlighted as a failed performative in managerial and mainstream discourses. Third, the article posits alternative methods that the CMS community might use to help make organizations less exploitative and more equitable. Fourth, we conclude by discussing the broader role of critique in management studies at this juncture. Our overall aim is to continue the ongoing dialogue about performativity in the CMS community and hopefully inform new avenues to achieve its stated objectives in business and society.

Critical Management Studies and the question of performativity

We will not provide a detailed overview of CMS as that has been done extensively elsewhere (see e.g. Adler et al., 2007; Alvesson et al., 2009; Banerjee, 2011a; Fournier and Grey, 2000; Spicer et al., 2009). CMS is characterized by a diversity of theoretical and philosophical perspectives. For instance, the 2013 Critical Management Studies conference held in Manchester comprised of 25 streams involving a wide range of topics such as critical perspectives on strategy, globalization, international business, diversity, feminism, race theory, human resource management, marketing, accounting, postcolonialism, sexuality, gender, postmodernism and environmentalism. CMS was established as a division in the Academy of Management in 2008. The domain statement of the CMS division describes its mission:

CMS serves as a forum within the Academy for the expression of views critical of established management practices and the established social order. Our premise is that structural features of contemporary society, such as the profit imperative, patriarchy, racial inequality, and ecological irresponsibility often turn organizations into instruments of domination and exploitation. Driven by a shared desire to change this situation, we aim in our research, teaching, and practice to develop critical interpretations of management and society and to generate radical alternatives. Our critique seeks to connect the practical shortcomings in management and individual managers to the demands of a socially divisive and ecologically destructive system within which managers work. (CMS, 2014)

Thus, CMS challenges the fundamental normative assumption that managerial notions of efficiency are universally desirable, and that pursuing profit motives can only lead to positive outcomes for the workforce and society. Moreover, CMS is driven by the desire (even if it does not always articulate the means) to transform existing power relations in organizations with a view to encouraging less oppressive practices that do not harm social and environmental welfare. As Fournier and Grey (2000: 16) argue, ‘to be engaged in critical management studies means, at the most basic level, to say that something is wrong with management, as a practice and body of knowledge, and that it should be changed’.

Along with de-naturalization and reflexivity, Fournier and Grey (2000) suggest that the principle of non-performativity is crucial to the CMS project: What exactly do Fournier and Grey (2000) mean by non-performativity? Let us imagine a CMS researcher studying changing employment practices in the United Kingdom. S/he gains access to a subsidiary of a multinational enterprise that has started to use zero-hours employment contracts to maximize profits for its parent company. These contracts have been widely condemned as exploitative and unjust since they insist employees always be on call but guarantee zero-hours of paid work (see Guardian, 2013). Our non-performative orientated CMS researcher would not be interested in generating knowledge that enables the efficiency and instrumentalization of this new employment system. Nor would s/he be overly sympathetic to the operational manager’s ‘point of view’ because employees are so obviously disadvantaged and suffering as a result. So what is our CMS scholar seeking to achieve in undertaking this research? Generally speaking, change hopefully. But here is the nub of the problem. How can critical researchers make an effective intervention while tenaciously remaining aloof (both ideologically and practically) of the concrete activities being described? What aspects of performativity, whether critical or progressive, can engage with this clearly exploitative practice to create a fairer outcome? If zero-hours contracts are practices created by the language of neoliberal capitalism, what other utterances have the power and agency to counter these practices?

Towards a performative Critical Management Studies?

Recent commentators have addressed questions like these by suggesting that CMS scholars must stop being so negative about the idea of working with managers to help bring about practical change. In their strident critique of Fournier and Grey (2000), Spicer et al. (2009) maintain that,

. . . a potential consequence of holding strong to the credo of anti-performativity is that CMS withdraws from attempts to engage with practitioners and mainstream management theorists who are at least partially concerned with issues of performativity . . . an anti-performative CMS satisfies itself with attempts to shock the mainstream out of its ideological slumber through intellectually ‘pissing in the street’. (Spicer et al., 2009: 542)

Critical scholars should instead become actively involved with everyday practitioners and engage with the language they use in an attempt to construct new realities and opportunities.

Following Spicer et al. (2009), Wickert and Schaefer (2014: 20) also implore the CMS community to have ‘greater impact on what managers actually do’. They are concerned that critical scholars fail to provide ‘knowledge for dealing with those aspects of managerial life that have been identified as problematic . . . and overlooks potential points of engagement with managers’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 5). Middle-managers in particular ought to be enlisted by CMS researchers because they are likely to be less aligned with organizational elites and potentially more sympathetic with frustrated subordinates to trigger progressive social change. For this reason too, Hartmann (2014: 626) argues the CMS community could also engage with managerial texts that are often dismissed in favour of critical theory, Marxism and feminism, in an attempt to subvert mainstream approaches and shift the discourse towards more emancipatory objectives instead. At least managerial texts provide a non-alienating ‘vocabulary to think progressively about alternatives without setting itself against the goals of organizations (i.e. it is not directly opposed to performative ends)’.

Critical and progressive performativity

To rectify the pitfalls of non-performativity, Spicer et al. (2009) posit ‘critical performativity’ as a practical alternative for CMS scholars. This model of impact can be achieved through an affirmative stance (getting close to the object of critique to reveal points of revision), an ethic of care (providing space for management’s viewpoint and collaborating with them to achieve emancipatory ends), pragmatism (being realistic about what can be achieved given structural constraints), engaging potentialities (leveraging points of possibility for changing managerial practices in an incremental rather than radical ‘revolutionary’ manner) and asserting a normative orientation (ideals for ‘good’ organizational practice).

Three implications of this approach are noteworthy. First, Spicer et al. (2009) move beyond Fournier and Grey’s (2000) Lyotardian conceptualization of performativity (i.e. input/output maximization) by drawing on other philosophical traditions that highlight how language/speech might count as social action (see Gond and Cabantous [2015] for an extended overview of this literature in the social sciences and philosophy). Austin (1963) and Butler’s (1990, 1993) notion of performative utterances (i.e. words that are also deeds) is considered especially important in this regard. Rather than functioning only as a secondary descriptor, language can also perform reality, as when a judge utters ‘I sentence you to . . .’ CMS researchers might thus create equitable organizational practices by intervening in management discourse and experimenting ‘with metaphors that might be floating around in the organization’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 547). Second, an ethic of affirmation and care implies that CMS ought to listen to management’s side of the story and engage in a ‘loving struggle’ (p. 548) with their language rather than simply criticize: ‘CMS needs to appreciate the contexts and constraints of management . . . from this follows some degree of respect and care’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 545). Third, CMS must be less ‘utopian’ in its emancipatory ambitions. Incremental and piecemeal change is more doable given the economic pressures managers confront in their daily routines and practices.

A similar set of reforms are outlined by Wickert and Schaefer (2014) in their notion of ‘progressive performativity’. The weakness of CMS for them is that it ‘provides only limited guidance on how (counterbalancing) values could be embedded into organizational practices and procedures in collaboration with, rather than in opposition to, managers’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 7, emphasis in original). They too advance a broader understanding of performativity related to language: ‘The performative element, we suggest, requires researchers to “activate” the language that managers use . . . In that way, CMS scholars may support managers to “talk into existence” new (counterbalancing) behaviours and practices’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 3). Two elements of progressive performativity follow from this proposition. First, through micro-level engagement CMS researchers can actively ally themselves with selected managers (preferably middlemanagers) to raise awareness and identify alternative speech acts. Second, this may lead to reflexive conscientization, whereby scholars help create discursive spaces ‘in which managers are gently “nudged” to reflect on their actions and the organizational processes to which their actions relate . . . [it seeks to] raise the critical consciousness of managers’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 3).

This can only be credibly achieved, according to Wickert and Schaefer, if scholars put aside the classical emancipatory ideals of CMS since they discourage micro-collaborations with managers, introduce concepts that alienate practitioners and ultimately make progressive change seemingly impossible. Utopianism, in particular, according to Wickert and Schaefer, introduces ‘complex problems [that] fill people with anxiety and limit their capacity to think and act creatively’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 14). They recommend non-utopian and ‘small-win’ initiatives instead, ‘moving forward by actively working towards incremental, rather than radical transformation of unfavourable social conditions’ (Wickert and Schaefer, 2014: 9–10).

Limitations of the new performative turn in Critical Management Studies

Space does not permit a full elaboration of the critical and progressive models of performativity being recommended to CMS researchers. But it is no exaggeration to suggest that the argumentation involved presents a rather caricatured image of the CMS community when exhorted to ‘overcome its often hypocritical and unproductive claims that its output has no performative intent whatsoever’ (Spicer et al. 2009: 554). As Alvesson et al. (2009: 10, emphasis in original) argue, non-performativity ‘emphatically does not mean an antagonistic attitude to any type of performing’. CMS only refrains from instrumentally contributing to the mean-ends rationality of corporate managerialism. It is not against all impact, since that would render its criticism something of a self-serving exercise that rightly ought to be admonished. Having said that, advocates of a new performativity do have a good point when they highlight the vagueness and ambiguity around what mechanisms of impact CMS actually does favour. How can the community help make a practical difference to organizational life so that they are less exploitative and more equitable?

Critical and progressive performativity may hold promise in this regard. However, we feel these models of influence carry overtly optimistic assumptions about the power of language to change certain structural realities as well as the capabilities of CMS scholars to perform emancipatory change through discourse and micro-level engagement. There may certainly be some cases where getting close to managers, empathizing with their constraints and manipulating their language may indeed yield the (micro) fulfilment of aspects of the CMS mission. For example, scholars have engaged with managers in developing critical perspectives on leadership (Cunliffe, 2009; Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011) and promoting reflexivity in managerial practice (Barge, 2004). However, we are concerned that the conceptualizations of performativity proposed lack a realistic appreciation of the accumulated social forces guiding organizational behaviour in these institutionalized contexts, including the profit motive, shareholder value, cost externalization, means-ends efficiency and so forth. While these forces are no doubt social and linguistically constructed too (e.g. see Callon [2010] in relation to the economy), they have also been politically and institutionally embedded over time and cannot simply be talked away. It is these conditions, we argue, that need to be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of CMS scholarship. Without a wider political analysis of organizations, institutions and markets, the capacity to perform economic rationality differently will be limited, which in turn restricts the scope for politics, political subjectivity and dialogue (see Cochoy et al., 2010). Hence, we would expect the mechanisms recommended by critical and progressive performativities to frequently fail rather than succeed.

#### 4---the aff can’t spill-up or meaningfully challenge corporate harms.

Reed 16, PhD, Professor of Political Science @ Penn (Adolph, “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”,” <http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2>)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9 I assume that Trotskyists of their stripe still call themselves Marxists; if so, theirs is a Marxism that has more in common with geometry texts and the Baltimore Catechism than with open-ended historical materialist analysis. Indeed, the catechistic disposition is the spirit animating their snarky observation that it is “telling” – though they never indicate what it would tell if the charge were correct — that I supposedly “never engage” with any of the “massive” evidence that racial discrimination persists against black Americans. I have never denied the persistence of racial discrimination and therefore have no idea what they mean by “engage with.” I assume that what they want is for me to recite a litany of abuses or violations, doing the Confiteor at the same time, whether or not doing so would contribute to understanding or rectifying anything. I don’t have to testify to my knowledge of the existence of racial discrimination. I’ve dealt with being on the receiving end of it all my life.10 Moreover, racial discrimination and racial disparity are not the same thing. The latter does not automatically result from the former. And discrimination is often not necessary for, or even implicated in, reproduction of disparities. This is a key argument that Merlin Chowkanyun and I develop in our critique of the discourse of racial disparity.11 We do not deny the existence of racial disparities. We do argue that “racism,” accompanied by whatever adjectives – institutional, structural, postracial, etc.12 — is often not helpful for understanding the genesis of those disparities, how they are reproduced, or how to address them in policy interventions. Instead of engaging with that argument Birch and Heideman resort to baseless observations such as their claim that I have “always prided [myself] on being ahead of the curve.” This personal characterization is a bizarre alternative to critical argument about what I actually contend. And, of course, this is yet another area in which Birch and Heideman have no idea what they’re talking about. They don’t know me or for that matter anything about me that’s not a matter of public record, in what I’ve written for public consumption. Like much in their essay, this is an instance of uninformed proclamation of what they would like to be true to fit the a priori commitments of their dogma, which, by the way, is rather surprisingly like liberal individualism in the extent to which it hinges on speculation regarding individuals’ motives rather than examination of patterned social relations and processes. Haste to proclaim the magical ship’s pending arrival on the coastline is more an effusion of True Belief – and that’s the generous characterization — than sober analysis. And the magical predictions don’t require evidence of oppositional agency of any sort. Many in the Jacobin audience may be too young to recall how ventriloquy of the kind that Birch and Heideman and others now project onto BLM demonstrations supported proclamations of grand, transformative potential that some ersatz leftists assigned to the 1995 Million Man March and then to the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO demonstrations. More, however, should be able to remember the tsunami of almost clinically naïve pronouncements in 2008 and 2009 that the financial crash had either put neoliberalism on its deathbed or perhaps already killed it. For those who don’t recall that moment, Merlin Chowkwanyun’s fine critical assessment should be a bracing corrective.13 The authors also construct straw men and blatantly misrepresent arguments to provide themselves with easy targets. They adduce the fact that BLM has generated a program as a counter to my contention that that fact is not especially meaningful. They do so, of course, without fully addressing my actual argument: Some, perhaps many, of the items propounded in the initial 10 Point Plan are fine as a statement of reforms that could make things better in the area of criminal justice policy and practice. Many, if not most, of those assembled under the rubric ‘Vision for Black Lives’ are empty sloganeering and politically wrongheaded and/or unattainable and counterproductive. However, the problem is not a shortage of potentially effective reforms that could be implemented. The problem is much more a political and strategic one. And the focus on racial disparity both obscures the nature and extent of the strategic challenges we face and…undercuts our ability to mount a potentially effective challenge (italics added).14 I noted as well that, reminiscent of the trajectory of Black Power, a similar moment of affectively evocative political expression, the programs articulated in the name of BLM came primarily as responses to criticisms that it lacked a program. Their relation to the actual political practice of those who purport to represent the brand – and how else are we to understand the reality beneath the fatuous justifications offered by Garza and others as to why it’s important to honor the hashtag and its originators? — is not at all clear. The notion that having a program is eo ipso an indication of being “part of a broader radicalization around issue [sic] of class and inequality” is reasonable only within the sectarian universe of resolutionary socialists15 who measure one another’s significance by whether or not they publish newspapers or have good websites. Birch and Heideman and I apparently talk past each other regarding whether BLM should be seen as a serious political movement. Where one comes down on that question depends on how one understands what counts as a movement. I have no idea what their criteria are; I do know that, as public relations engineering has become increasingly prominent as an alternative to slow, careful organizing and constituency building, the label has been thrown around ever more promiscuously. When I refer to a political movement, as I’ve stressed for many years,16 I mean a relatively durable social and political force with a demonstrated capacity to mobilize resources and clearly defined constituencies – including actual people who have names and addresses – to advance programs and agendas with the goal of altering public policy and/or power relations. I don’t see how BLM qualifies by that standard. Activism undertaken under that name has contributed significantly to focusing public attention on patterns of police abuse and broader miscarriages of justice in the criminal justice system. However, from the perspective I indicate, extrapolations from that fact to broader claims that BLM is a substantial political movement are hyperbolic or aspirational. Birch and Heideman may operate with a different understanding of what constitutes a political movement. I assume they do because of their insistence that BLM is one, but they don’t address that question. They seem to accept proclamation by the self-appointed spokespersons – including those who claim not to be spokespersons while obviously adopting that role – press releases, demonstrations and other staged events in the mass-mediated (including social media) pageantry of protest as adequate evidence. In any event, I thought I had also made clear that the principal reason I, in their view, “refuse to engage even with the aspects” of the BLM current that the authors presume to be “in sync with” my politics and am not interested in helping to “advance a class perspective within the movement” is that my judgment is that what passes under the rubric BLM is primarily a mélange of episodic actions and performances and is not a coherent political movement. I know the response to that skepticism is assertion of BLM’s inner potentiality, which supporters contend is visible through a combination of esoteric interpretation and Faith and which skeptics are too jaundiced or biased to see – i.e., the cargo-cult pathology. Birch and Heideman say as much themselves: It is of course true that “Black Lives Matter” is shorthand for a variety of organizing efforts, whose goals can sometimes be opaque. The protests of the past two years are hardly the first to focus on questions of police violence or racism. And like many movements today, Black Lives Matter suffers from chronic volatility and organizational weakness.17 Thus even they acknowledge that, as Cedric Johnson indicates in a forthcoming article, who and what BLM is are in no way clear. The contemporary “movement for black lives” is a diverse phenomenon – horizontal, decentralized, and driven by organizations like #BlackLivesMatter, the Dream Defenders, the Black Youth Project 100, Assata’s Daughters, Freedom, Inc., Southerners on New Ground, Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, as well as dozens of other youth groups, black student unions and community-based organizations. Contemporary protests have found broad support among liberals, black nationalists, socialists, clergy, politicians, civil liberties advocates, and urbanites…Of course, there are different ideological tendencies operating within the movement for black lives. Broad acceptance of black ethnic politics, however, facilitates the very brokerage politics that many activists dislike about older black civil rights organizations. The spats between black lives matter’s founders and those who sought to use the hashtag without their permission reflected a proprietary sensibility, more suited to product branding and entrepreneurship than popular social struggle. Despite the various allusions to class and insistence by some supporters that there is a class-politics at the heart of black lives matter activism, the rapture of “unapologetic blackness” and the ethnic politics that expression implies will continue to lead away from the kind of political work that is needed to end the policing crisis.18 Comparing BLM’s commitment to the romantic racialism of the National Black Convention movement and following its trajectory through the 1972 Gary Convention, which rested on a similar commitment to a romantic racialism, Johnson contends: If the Gary Convention is the model here, then what we might expect is the fracturing of the movement into different brokerage camps, each claiming to represent the “black community” more effectively than the other, and more capable of amassing the necessary counterpower that might be politically impactful. One signpost of this possible outcome is the growing fissure among activists over school privatization and futile attempts to reconcile those differences with romantic calls to black unity…Black Lives Matter co-founder Patrice Cullors gives a sense of this problem, when she says that she will continue to work with black neoliberals because of their common bond as blacks. “That I don’t agree with neoliberalism doesn’t encourage me to launch an online assault against those who do. We can, in fact, agree to disagree. We can have healthy debate. We can show up for one another as Black folks inside of this movement in ways that don’t isolate, terrorize, and shame people – something I’ve experienced first hand.” She mistakes the core basis of political life, however. Sustained political work is held together by shared historical interests, especially those that connect to our daily lives and felt needs, not sentimental “ties of blood.”19 To what, then, are Birch and Heideman referring when they declare BLM’s potential? Which strains are the real or even the really real expressions of the tendency’s radical anti-capitalist telos? The answer, steeped in circular reasoning, is the ones that Birch and Heideman want to believe are consistent with their transhistorical, preformationist notions of how movements grow. This is not simply a matter of stipulating different criteria for assigning the label “political movement.” BLM’s amorphousness reflects and enables another tiresome political pathology that has become increasingly common in an era when an actually insurgent left is so remote from living memory and cargo-cult politics is so prominent. Activists, typically without visible institutional connections, stage more or less flamboyant events that often evoke nostalgic associations with earlier insurgencies – civil rights/Black Power demonstrations, sit-ins, militant “street action,” even purely rhetorical appropriation of the phrase “general strike” as a reference that sounds appealingly militant, totally disconnected from any concrete practice. Prior to BLM, Occupy and, more cynically, the Tea Party were the most highly publicized illustrations of this phenomenon, which is similar to an ad agency approach to movement-building. The point of these performances is to project simulacra of popular insurgency, which then become justification for issuing press statements and manifestos and, depending on the mood of the moment and skills of the operators, being recognized as spokespersons for the fictive movement. In the public interest world such groups are described as “astro-turf,” as contrasted to grassroots. Proliferation of this Kabuki theater politics among leftists stems in part from the dialectic of desperation and wishful thinking that underlies the cargo-cult tendency; it is commonly driven by an understandable sense of urgency that the dangers facing us are so grave as to require some immediate action in response. That dialectic encourages immediatist fantasies as well as tendencies to define the direct goal of political action as exposing, or bearing witness against, injustice. Occupy, for instance, proceeded from premises at least overlapping a tendency I have described as the Myth of the Spark,20 the notion that single events or dramatic acts can in themselves galvanize mass mobilization. That was also the dream that too many enthusiasts crafted for themselves about the Sanders campaign. Fetishization of the power of social media feeds the fantasy that movement-building can be automatic and instantaneous. That disposition is exacerbated in a context in which organizing as a project of deepening and broadening an actual base through building solidaristic relationships around shared interests is not part of an activistist culture in which radicalism is more posture and performance than strategic pursuit of a program.21 The strains of Trotskyism and anarchism popular in some activist quarters are drawn to spontaneist and voluntarist approaches to politics, which fit comfortably as well with the logic of insta-celebrity generated through Potemkin internet and social media campaigns. From that perspective, one of the most revealing and chilling features of the BLM phenomenon has been the unself-conscious clarity with which Alicia Garza and other of its prominent personalities represent, and no doubt genuinely understand, crafting and projecting their individual personae as identical with advancing political objectives.22 The potential for opportunism is great because the inertial material imperatives impel in that direction and unrestrained because the “movement” has no concrete constituency to which its spokespeople are accountable. What we get instead are shopworn calls to distinguish the really authentic BLM voices – i.e., what DeRay McKesson was until he wasn’t – from the fakers and hustlers and those who are genuinely grassroots from those who aren’t. So Birch and Heideman finger McKesson as epitomizing a “black professional class selling a desiccated form of opposition to racism as radical politics.” What distinguishes this “desiccated form of opposition to racism” from the good, radical anti-racism they insist is out there? The only clue we have is that McKesson embodies the former. Yet a year ago he embodied the latter! This kind of political differentiation grounded on claims to racial authenticity rehearses the product cycle in the hip-hop industry in the 1990s, in which an act started out packaged as authentic or hardcore, attained success and became crossover and thence became a target against which those that follow proclaim their own real authenticity. This sort of politics is also, as we’ve seen at least since Black Power, a hustler’s paradise. And all the millennial versions of New Age-y bullshit about leaderlessness and structurelessness obscure the fact that absence of organizational mechanisms of accountability enable anyone to say anything, or deny anything said, in the name of the “movement.” Overestimation of the political significance of protest and a related, all too familiar problem of confusing militancy and radicalism contribute to exaggerating the significance of eruptions like those associated with BLM. Militancy is a posture; radicalism is linked to program for social transformation, and protests do not necessarily challenge power relations at all. In some ways, as political scientists have pointed out for generations, they can validate existing power relations insofar as they appeal to established authority to accommodate their demands and pursue more effective incorporation into extant governing coalitions.23 Although they are so commonplace now that most people no doubt rehearse them unreflectively, presumptions that protest actions and militant postures are intrinsically radical or follow a natural trajectory leading them toward radicalism depend on the nostalgic wishful thinking and forms of fallacious reasoning I’ve already discussed.

#### 5---Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139

Conclusion

Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

#### 6---“Will to tech” good. Drones solve global crisis stability through deterrence and confidence-building.

Horowitz et al. 16, \*Michael C., Professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, \*\*Sarah E. Kreps, Professor of Government and Adjunct Professor of Law at Cornell University, \*\*\*Matthew Fuhrmann, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. (11/10/16, "Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation", *MIT Press Journals*, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00257) \*language edited---brackets denote a change

There are also reasons to think that using drones for surveillance could be stabilizing. Drones could give both sides in a dispute real-time information about the situation at lower cost, and with lower risk to personnel, than is possible at present. Countries can use drones deployed near or at their borders to surveil more persistently over contested areas or even over their adversaries' territory. Improved surveillance from persistent drone deployments could reduce the risk of conflict for two reasons. First, information provided by drones could reassure a state that its enemy is not planning to launch an attack, thus lowering the risk of destabilizing countermeasures.

Second, the existence of surveillance drones could decrease the ability of potential aggressors to conduct surprise attacks or covert activities. With the aid of surveillance drones, potential targets can take appropriate preparations if they observe military deployments. Drones, then, may be useful for deterrence by denial:108 if the potential aggressor believes that the element of surprise is critical to operational success, and that drones flying near the border would give the other state adequate notice, it may be less likely to launch an attack. Both of these mechanisms could reinforce stability, even when their relative impact is small.

To illustrate, consider the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Japan currently maintains situational awareness mostly using satellites and ~~manned~~ maritime vessels. Japan could gain even better situational awareness if it had more robust ~~unmanned~~ systems in the air and on the sea. Although this type of capability would not make a conflict less likely in the case of a deliberate Chinese attempt to take the islands, it could help reassure Tokyo about Beijing's intentions (if China deployed similar capabilities at a longer standoff range, it might be similarly reassured). And, in a world where China would want to take the islands only if it could catch Japan unaware, Japanese surveillance drones might reduce the feasibility of a surprise attack.

This scenario is not just hypothetical. Japan's purchase of Global Hawk, confirmed in November 2014, suggests that UAVs are likely to play a growing role in maritime surveillance.109 Given the large number of maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, ~~unmanned~~ [unpiloted] surveillance systems could provide a new type of confidence-building measure that would make inadvertent escalation less likely. Moreover, such surveillance systems could make it easier for regional actors to monitor Chinese actions such as building airstrips on the Spratly Islands.110 In some cases, actors may not become aware of Chinese activities until it is too late to stop them. ~~Unmanned~~ surveillance systems, if they provide real-time monitoring, could therefore serve a deterrent role as well, because those actors attempting to change the status quo in disputed regions will have to do so in the public eye.

#### 7---1AC Kroker cites Heidegger---that’s complicit in Nazism.

Faye 9 (Emmanuel, associate professor at the University Paris – Ouest-Nanterre La Defense and an authority on Descartes, Translated by Michael B. Smith, professor emeritus of French and philosophy at Berry College, “HEIDEGGER: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy”, pg xxiii-xxv)

We have not yet grasped the full significance of the propagation of Nazism and Hitlerism in the domain of thought and ideas---that mounting tidal wave that sweeps up minds, dominates them, possesses them, and eventually overcomes all resistance. Against it, the military victory was but the winning of a first battle---a vital one, to be sure, and a costly one for humanity, since it took a world war. Today a different battle, more protracted and sinister, is unfolding: a contest in which the future of the human race is at stake. It calls for a heightened awareness in all areas of thought, from philosophy to law and history. Whether we are considering the case of Heidegger, Schmitt, Junger (in many respects), or Nolte, these main propagators of Nazism in the life of letters have taken the time to refine their strategy of reconquest after the defeat of the armies of Hitler’s Reich. By an interplay of the obfuscation of real causes, the dilution of responsibilities in a globalization of approaches, the disqualification of humanistic thought and universal values, the mythologizing of self in the figure of the “shepard of being,” the “Christian Epimetheus,” the “anarch,” the theoretician of the “historical right,” these authors have scripted the roles of philosophy, law, letters, and history, enlisting them in the service of the “revision” and ultimately of the rehabilitation of foundations of Nazism. Some have progressively conquered a planetary audience with a public that most often does not realize what is at stake, in the long run, in this conquest of minds. It is true that the front lines of the invasion are not found on any map. There is no geopolitics of the mind, although the increasing number of apologetic or too complacent works in an indication of the magnitude of its propagation. Nevertheless, centers of criticism and resistance have sprung up progressively in many countries. For Heidegger, the subject of this work, very incisive criticisms have been raised, both in Europe and on the American continent, since Karl Lowith perceived and reported as early as 1947 that he was “more radical than Mr. Kriech and Mr. Rosenberg,” two pillars of the Nazi regime, but who, being less adroit and more trivial, did not see their reputations survive the defeat of the Third Reich. Furthermore, new documents and deeper research allow us today to see to what extent Heidegger devoted himself to putting philosophy at the service of legitimizing and diffusing the very bases of Nazism and Hitlerism. That is why I want to make available to the public some of the most significant moments of the seminars taught between 1933 and 1935, taken from the archives of Heidegger’s unpublished manuscripts. A few of these texts, known to only a handful of researchers, are in fact political education courses at the service of Hitler’s state and go so far as to identify the ontological difference between being and individual entities with the political relationship between the state and the people, while other texts explicitly explore the means of perpetuating the “spirit” of Nazism. In making these excerpts public, my intention has been simply to exercise the right to historical and philosophical truth. I have also based my work on the speeches, lectures, and courses over these same years that have recently appeared in Germany and can be consulted only by readers of German. These texts, published in volumes 16, 36/37, and 38 of the so-called complete works, are every bit as racist and virulently National Socialist as those of the official “philosophers” of Nazism, such as Alfred Baeumler or Hans Heyse. They surpass the others by the virulence of their Hitlerism, which no other “philosopher” of the regime has equaled. Despite that, these Hitlerian and Nazi Texts of Heidegger are to be found on the philosophy shelves of public libraries. The seriousness of that situation calls for a new and heightened awareness. Without ever dissociating philosophical reflection from indispensable historical investigation, I have tried to bring together the establishment and analysis of historical and textual sources, as the historians Hugo Ott and Bernd Martin (as well as Guido Schneeberger and Victor Farias), with the philosophical critique, which has been developed by a series of authors as varied as Ernst Cassirer, Benedetto Croce, Karl Lowith, Theodor Adorno, Gunther Anders, Hans Blumenberg, Jurgen Habermas, Ernst Tugendhat, Eric Weil, Rainer Marten, Nicolas Tertulian, Jeffrey Barash, Domenico Losurdo, Arno Munster, Richard Wolin, Tom Rockmore, Thomas Sheehan, Herman Philipse, Hassan Givsan, Reinhard Linde, and Julio Quesada, to mention but a few of the most important names. But this book proposes a new understanding of what Heidegger brought about. With the help of texts little known outside the German-speaking world, some not even published, and taking into account those individuals with whom he chose to surround himself---the “philosopher” Erich Rothacker, the historian Rudolf Stadelmann, and the legal scholar Erik Wolf---I intend to prove that the question of the relationship between Heidegger and National Socialism is not that of the personal commitment of a man temporarily gone astray and a philosophical work that remains almost unaffected, but rather that of the deliberate introduction of the foundations of Nazism and Hitlerism into philosophy and its teaching. In showing this, it is not my desire to add to Heidegger’s renown by making it even more diabolical. I do not subscribe to the theory of a Heidegger “thinker” of Nazism, because rather than enlightening us, he has done nothing but blend the characteristic opacity of his teaching with the darkness of the phenomenon. Far from furthering the progress of thought, Heidegger has helped to conceal the deeply destructive nature of the Hitlerian undertaking by exalting its “grandeur.” Far from enriching philosophy, he has worked to destroy it, by making it subservient to a movement that, by the murderous discrimination underlying it and the project of collective annihilation to which it leads, constitutes the radical negation of all humanity and all thought. After the paroxysm of the Nazi and Hitlerian period, long elaborated in Heidegger’s writings even before 1933, and after the toxic spite often characterizing his courses taught in 1933-1934, the diffusion of Heidegger’s works after the war slowly descends like ashes after an explosion---a gray cloud slowly suffocating and extinguishing minds. Soon the 102 volumes of the so-called complete work (sixty-six volumes have appeared to date), in which the same assertions are repeated over and over through thousands of pages, will encumber by their sheer bulk the shelves reserved for twentieth century philosophy and continue to spread the fundamental tenets of Nazism on a world-wide scale.

### 1NC---Extra

#### 8---Transition fails:

#### A---Elite backlash.

Wright 17, \*Erik Olin Wright, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Director of A. E. Havens Center for Social Justice, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (2017, “How to be an Anti-capitalist for the 21st Century”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/124/12452111002/html/)

Smashing

This is the classic strategic logic of revolutionaries. The rationale goes something like this:

The system is rotten. All efforts to make life tolerable within capitalism will eventually fail. From time to time small reforms that improve the lives of people may be possible when popular forces are strong, but such improvements will always be fragile, vulnerable to attack and reversible. Ultimately it is an illusion that capitalism can be rendered a benign social order in which ordinary people can live flourishing, meaningful lives. At its core, capitalism is unreformable. The only hope is to destroy it, sweep away the rubble and then build an alternative. As the closing words of the early twentieth century song Solidarity Forever proclaim, “We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.” The full realization of the emancipatory alternative may be gradual, but the necessary condition for such a gradual transition is a ruptural break in the existing system of power.

But how to do this? How is it possible for anti-capitalist forces to amass sufficient power to destroy capitalism and replace it with a better alternative? This is indeed a daunting task, for the power of dominant classes that makes reform an illusion also blocks the revolutionary goal of a rupture in the system. Anti-capitalist revolutionary theory, informed by the writings of Marx and extended by Lenin, Gramsci and others, offered an attractive argument about how this could take place:

While it is true that much of the time capitalism seems unassailable, it is also a deeply contradictory system, prone to disruptions and crises. Sometimes those crises reach an intensity which makes the system as a whole fragile, vulnerable to challenge. In the strongest versions of the theory, there are even underlying tendencies in the “laws of motion” of capitalism for the intensity of such system-weakening crises to increase over time, so that in the long-term capitalism becomes unsustainable; it destroys its own conditions of existence. But even if there is no systematic tendency for crises to become ever-worse, what can be predicted is that periodically there will be intense capitalist economic crises in which the system becomes vulnerable and ruptures become possible. The problem for a revolutionary party, therefore, is to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity created by such system-level crises to lead a mass mobilization to seize state power, either through elections or through an insurrectionary overthrow of the existing regime. Once in control of the state, the first task is to rapidly refashion the state itself to make it a suitable weapon of ruptural transformation, and then use that power to repress the opposition of the dominant classes and their allies, dismantle the pivotal power structures of capitalism, and build the necessary institutions for the long-term development of an alternative economic system.

In the 20th century, various versions of this general line of reasoning animated the imagination of revolutionaries around the world. Revolutionary Marxism infused struggles with hope and optimism, for it not only provided a potent indictment of the world as it existed, but also provided a plausible scenario for how an emancipatory alternative could be realized. This gave people courage, sustaining the belief that they were on the side of history and that the enormous commitment and sacrifices they were called on to make in their struggles against capitalism had real prospects of eventually succeeding. And sometimes, if rarely, such struggles did culminate in the revolutionary seizure of state power.

The results of such revolutionary seizures of power, however, were never the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, emancipatory alternative to capitalism. While revolutions in the name of socialism and communism did demonstrate that it was possible “to build a new world from the ashes of the old,” and in certain specific ways they may have improved the material conditions of life of most people for a period of time, the evidence of the heroic attempts at rupture in the 20th century is that they do not produce the kind of new world envisioned in revolutionary ideology. It is one thing to burn down old institutions and social structures; it is quite another to build emancipatory new institutions from the ashes.

Why the revolutions of the 20th century never resulted in robust, sustainable human emancipation is, of course, a hotly debated matter. Some people argue that this was just because of the historically specific, unfavorable circumstances of the attempts at system-wide ruptures. Revolutions occurred in economically backward societies, surrounded by powerful enemies. Some argue it was because of strategic errors of the leadership of those revolutions. Others indict the motives of leadership: the leaders that triumphed in the course of these revolutions were motivated by desires for status and power rather than the empowerment and wellbeing of the masses. And still others argue that failure is intrinsic to any attempt at radical rupture in a social system. There are too many moving parts, too much complexity and too many unintended consequences. As a result, attempts at system-rupture will inevitably tend to unravel into such chaos that revolutionary elites, regardless of their motives, will be compelled to resort to pervasive violence and repression to sustain social order. Such violence, in turn, destroys the possibility for a genuinely democratic, participatory process of building a new society.

#### B---Decline causes nationalism and fascism.

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3.2. Implications of rapidly transforming social systems The social practices lens is also useful for thinking about possible wellbeing implications of rapid social change more generally, and a transition away from a growth-based economy specifically. While the concept of social practices inherently implies the possibility of change (with its focus on agency and creativity), it equally strongly highlights the structural aspects of practices which provide stability and orientation. During times of rapid social transitions, social norms and ‘mental infrastructures’ often lag behind, creating disorientation, social conflict, and negative impacts on wellbeing ([Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0060)). Stability of structural dimensions of social practices offers orientation and some extent of predictability of how oneself and other people are likely to act in the future, providing a framework within which flexibility and change are possible. This orienting function of structural dimensions of practices is likely to be an important condition for people to form reasonably stable identities and relationships – key ingredients for wellbeing. Examples from classical and contemporary [sociological and psychological research](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/sociological-research) suggest that different speeds of changing social structures can establish misalignments and disruptions of social practices which can, in turn, negatively influence health and other wellbeing outcomes. For instance, in his classical study, Durkheim presents suicide at least partly as an outcome of a failure of cultural resources to provide meaning and orientation in the context of other, more rapid social changes ([Durkheim, 2006](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0125); [Vega & Rumbaut, 1991: 375](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0455)). This idea also links to Bourdieu’s concept of the “hysteresis effect”. Here, Bourdieu emphasises that, especially during phases of social transition, people’s habitus and “objective” social circumstances can become disjointed: as a result of [hysteresis](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/hysteresis), dispositions can be “out of line with the field and with the ‘collective expectations’ which are constitutive of its normality. This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed” ([Bourdieu, 2000: 160](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0040)). This can contribute to a deterioration of people’s wellbeing as it makes them feel “out of place” or let them be perceived that way, “plung[ing] them deeper into failure” ([Bourdieu, 2000: 161](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0040)) because they cannot make use of new opportunities or are mistreated or socially excluded by others. Empirical research which partly builds on the idea of hysteresis has shown that wide-ranging organisational change can have a range of negative effects on people’s health and mortality ([Ferrie et al., 1998](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0150); [McDonough & Polzer, 2012](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0315)). One study found that across 174 countries, several measures of wellbeing and social performance, including life satisfaction, health, safety and trust, voice and accountability, were highest in periods of economic stability, but lower in times of GDP growth or contraction ([O’Neill, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0355)); and other studies concluded that life expectancy can be negatively affected by both rapid economic growth and contraction ([Notzon et al., 1998](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0345); [Szreter, 1999](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0445)). Several scholars have recently highlighted the potential for social conflict inherent in (rapid) social change. For instance, Maja [Göpel (2016: 49)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0185) remarks: “Unsurprisingly, the navigation or transition phase in shifting paradigms as well as governance solutions is marked by chaos, politicization, unease and power-ridden struggles”. Wolfgang Streeck has issued similar warnings ([Streeck et al., 2016: 169](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0435)). It is not difficult to see how such scenarios bear the potential of undermining some of the fundamental conditions that are necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs as discussed above, and hence the danger of generating substantial wellbeing losses for current and near-future generations. In the current context, it is very difficult to imagine that we might be able to observe a rapid and radical cultural change in which people adopt identities and related lifestyles that value intrinsically motivated activities over pursuing satisfaction and status through careers and consumption. Even more worryingly, political events in Europe, the United States and elsewhere since the ‘Great Crash’ of 2008 indicate that times of negative or stagnant growth can provide a breeding ground for populist, nationalistic and anti-democratic movements. Economic insecurity, a perceived threat of established identities through migrants, and deep mistrust against ‘elite’ politicians are amongst the main explanations for previously unimaginable events such as the [Brexit](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/brexit) vote, Trump presidency, and recent electoral successes for far right-wing parties in a range of European countries.

#### 9---Cap solves warming. Clean energy is rapidly superseding fossil fuels which is key to avoid tipping points.

Wallace-Wells 21, \*David Wallace-Wells is deputy editor of New York magazine, where he also writes frequently about climate change and the near future of science and technology; (January 18th, 2021, “After Alarmism”, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/climate-change-after-pandemic.html)

The change is much bigger than the turnover of American leadership. By the time the Biden presidency finds its footing in a vaccinated world, the bounds of climate possibility will have been remade. Just a half-decade ago, it was widely believed that a “business as usual” emissions path would bring the planet four or five degrees of warming — enough to make large parts of Earth effectively uninhabitable. Now, thanks to the rapid death of coal, the revolution in the price of renewable energy, and a global climate politics forged by a generational awakening, the [expectation](https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/) is for about three degrees. Recent pledges [could bring us closer to two](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/global-update-paris-agreement-turning-point/). All of these projections sketch a hazardous and unequal future, and all are clouded with uncertainties — about the climate system, about technology, about the dexterity and intensity of human response, about how inequitably the most punishing impacts will be distributed. Yet if each half-degree of warming marks an entirely different level of suffering, we appear to have shaved a few of them off our likeliest end stage in not much time at all.

The next half-degrees will be harder to shave off, and the most crucial increment — getting from two degrees to 1.5 — perhaps impossible, dashing the dream of avoiding what was long described as “catastrophic” change. But for a climate alarmist like me, seeing clearly the state of the planet’s future now requires a conspicuous kind of double vision, in which a guarded optimism seems perhaps as reasonable as panic. Given how long we’ve waited to move, what counts now as a best-case outcome remains grim. It also appears, miraculously, within reach.

In December, a month after Biden was elected promising to return the U.S. to the Paris agreement, the U.N. celebrated five years since the signing of those accords. They were five of the six hottest on record. (The sixth was 2015, the year the agreement was signed.) They were also the years with the highest levels of carbon output in the history of humanity — with emissions equivalent to what was produced by all human and industrial activity from the speciation of Homo sapiens to the start of World War II.

They have also been the five years in which the nations of the world — and cities and regions, individuals and institutions, corporations and central banks — have made the most ambitious pledges of future climate action. Most of them were made in the past 12 months, in the face of the pandemic. Or, perhaps, to some degree, because of it — because the pandemic demanded a full-body jolt to the global political economy, provoking much more aggressive government spending, a much more accommodating perspective on debt, and a much greater openness to large-scale actions and investments of the kind that might plausibly reshape the world. And because decarbonization has come to seem, even to those economists and policy-makers blinded for decades to the moral and humanitarian cases for reform, a rational investment. “When I think about climate change,” Biden is fond of saying, “the word I think of is jobs.”

There are two ways of looking at these seemingly contradictory sets of facts. The first is that the distance between what is being done and what needs to be done is only growing. This is the finding of, among others, the U.N.’s comprehensive [“Emissions Gap” report](https://www.unenvironment.org/emissions-gap-report-2020), issued in December, which found that staying below two degrees of warming would require a tripling of stated ambitions. To bring the planet in reach of the 1.5-degree target — favored by activists, most scientists, and really anyone reading their work with open eyes — would require a quintupling. It is also the perspective of Greta Thunberg, who has spent the pandemic year castigating global leaders for paying mere lip service to far-off decarbonization targets and who called the E.U.’s new net-zero emissions law “surrender.”

The second is that all of the relevant curves are bending — too slowly but nevertheless in the right direction. The International Energy Agency, a notoriously conservative forecaster, recently [called](https://www.carbonbrief.org/solar-is-now-cheapest-electricity-in-history-confirms-iea#:~:text=Source%3A%20IEA%20World%20Energy%20Outlook%202020.&text=Together%2C%20low%2Dcarbon%20sources%20would,up%20from%2019%25%20in%202019.) solar power “the cheapest electricity in history” and projected that India will build 86 percent less new coal power capacity than it thought just one year ago. Today, business as usual no longer means a fivefold increase of coal use this century, as was once expected. It means pretty rapid decarbonization, at least by the standards of history, in which hardly any has ever taken place before.

Both of these perspectives are true. The gap is real, and the world risks tumbling into it, subjecting much of the global South to unconscionable punishments all the way down. But in the months since the pandemic wiped climate strikers off the streets, their concerns have seeped into not just public-opinion surveys but parliaments and presidencies, trade deals and the advertising business, finance and insurance — in short, all the citadels presiding over the ancien régime of fossil capital.

This is not exactly a climate revolution; the strikers and their allies didn’t win in the way they wanted to, at least not yet. But they did win something. Environmental anxieties haven’t toppled neoliberalism. Instead, to an unprecedented degree, they infiltrated it. (Or perhaps they were appropriated by it. It’s an open question.) Climate change isn’t an issue just for die-hards anymore — it’s for normies, sellouts, and anyone with their finger in the wind. It will take time, of course, for voters to see empty rhetoric for what it is, and for consumers to learn to distinguish, say, between the claims of guiltless airline tickets, or between carbon-free foods in the supermarket aisle. Harder still will be sorting through the differences between real corporate commitments like Microsoft’s and more evasive ones, like BP’s. Already, there is considerable consternation among climate activists that the public doesn’t understand the tricky math of “net-zero” on which so many of these commitments have been made—it is not a promise of ending emissions, but of offsetting some amount of them, in the future, with “negative emissions,” sometimes called “carbon dioxide removal,” though no approach of that kind is ready to go at anything like the necessary scale. And while some amount of skepticism about those commitments is surely warranted, it is also the case that, according to [a recent Bloomberg review](https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-company-emissions-pledges/), of 187 corporate climate pledges made for 2020 in 2015, 138 will be met. (Many of those promises were quite modest, but it is a much better performance than has been managed by the 189 parties to the Paris agreement, of which only two — Morocco and Gambia — are today [judged](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/) fully “compatible” with the 1.5-degree goal, and only six more with the 2-degree target).

In the political sphere, the uneasy alliance between activists and those in power will be tested, producing new conflicts, or new equilibria, or both. Consider, though, that Varshini Prakash, whose [Sunrise Movement](https://www.sunrisemovement.org/) gave Biden’s primary candidacy an F, later helped write his climate plan along with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Climate expertise has been distributed throughout the incoming administration, as was promised during a campaign that closed, remarkably, with a climate-focused advertising blitz. During the transition, Biden’s pick for director of the National Economic Council, Brian Deese, was targeted by the environmental left for his time with BlackRock, but even this purported stooge had been married by Bill McKibben, one of the godfathers of modern climate activism.

Elsewhere in the world, where 85 percent of global emissions are produced, the great infiltration of climate concerns represents what the British environmental [writer](https://www.businessgreen.com/blog-post/4025199/2020-crisis-crossroads-alternative-histories) James Murray has called “an alternative history to 2020” and what the scientist turned journalist Akshat Rathi [has declared](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-05/climate-action-is-embedding-into-how-the-world-works) “a strong sign that climate action is starting to be ‘institutionalized’ — that is, getting deeply embedded into how the world works.” This is not about coronavirus lockdowns producing emissions drops or “nature healing.” It is instead about long-standing trajectories passing obvious tipping points in coal use and political salience; promises and posturing by powerful if compromised institutions; and policy progress almost smuggled into place, all over the world, under cover of pandemic night. In the U.S., in the second coronavirus stimulus, [$35 billion in clean-energy spending](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/12/what-is-in-covid-stimulus-omnibus-climate-pell-grants-medical-billing.html) passed in the Senate 92-6 — an effective down payment, energy researcher Varun Sivaram has estimated, on the innovation spending needed for a full electrification of the country. Did you even notice?

Biden’s climate plan now faces the challenge of a filibuster, a skeptical Supreme Court, and the mood of Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, which means American climate action over the next four years is probably more likely to be delivered piecemeal — through appropriations and stimulus, executive action, and regulation — than through a landmark Green New Deal–style piece of legislation. That does limit what can be achieved, but it also means avoiding a protracted battle over climate as a referendum on the identity of the nation. And at least nominally, having been pressured by activists to do so, Biden is promising to multiply the green spending in that recent stimulus by a factor of 60.

The numbers are numbingly large — reminders that in the midst of pandemic turmoil, the rules of state spending have been dramatically revised and perhaps even suspended. Is this global free-spending binge the beginning of a new era or merely a crisis interregnum to be followed by a new new austerity? “We don’t know what the recovery packages of COVID are going to be,” Christiana Figueres, one of the central architects of the Paris accords, told me this summer. “And honestly, the depth of decarbonization is going to largely depend on the characteristics of those recovery packages more than on anything else, because of their scale. We’re already at $12 trillion; we could go up to $20 trillion over the next 18 months. We have never seen — the world has never seen — $20 trillion go into the economy over such a short period of time. That is going to determine the logic, the structures, and certainly the carbon intensity of the global economy at least for a decade, if not more.”

For those dreaming of a climate recovery, the first round of spending was not so encouraging. The E.U. was the gold standard, promising that 30 percent of its stimulus would be earmarked for climate. The U.S. and China each pledged only a fraction of that (and in each case, there was fossil stimulus, too). But in October, a team of researchers including Joeri Rogelj of the Imperial College of London [calculated](https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-stimulus/tenth-of-pandemic-stimulus-spend-could-help-world-reach-climate-goals-study-idUSKBN271098) that just one-tenth of the COVID-19 stimulus spending already committed around the world, directed toward decarbonization during each of the next five years, would be sufficient to deliver the goals of the Paris agreement and stop global warming well below two degrees. That analysis may be a touch optimistic, but the level of spending seems, now, doable.

When Donald Trump was elected, trashing Paris, climate hawks were left hoping that the world would hang on for the length of his administration — insisting that, in the long term, the crisis couldn’t be solved without America at the helm. But the past four years of missing leadership have produced astonishing gains.

The price of solar energy has fallen ninefold over the past decade, as has the price of lithium batteries, critical to the growth of electric cars. The costs of utility-scale batteries, which could solve the “intermittency” (i.e., cloudy day) problem of renewables and help power whole cities in relatively short order, have fallen 70 percent since just 2015. Wind power is 40 percent cheaper than it was a decade ago, with offshore wind experiencing an even steeper decline. Overall, renewable energy is less expensive than dirty energy almost everywhere on the planet, and in many places it is simply cheaper to build new renewable capacity than to continue running the old fossil-fuel infrastructure. Oil demand and carbon emissions may both have peaked this year. Eighty percent of coal plants planned in Asia’s developing countries have been shelved.

This summer, I heard the Australian scientist and entrepreneur Saul Griffith talk about what it would take to get the U.S. within range of a 1.5 degree world. He said it would mean that beginning in 2021, this year, every single person buying a new car would have to be buying an electric one. That seems unrealistic, I thought, making a note of it as a useful benchmark illustrating just how far we have to go.

Then, in the fall, the U.K. pledged to ban nonelectrics by 2030—a once-unthinkable law coming both too slow and much more quickly than seemed possible not very long ago. Similar plans are now in place in 16 other countries, plus Massachusetts and California. Canada recently raised its tax on carbon sixfold. Italy cut its power-sector emissions 65 percent between 2012 and 2019, and Denmark is now aiming to reduce its overall emissions 70 percent by 2030. “We set ourselves challenges that on paper looked almost impossible,” the country’s minister for the environment, Dan Jørgensen, told me recently. “And I think experts in many countries said, when looking at Denmark, ‘This is going to be too expensive, this is going to lower their living standards, this is going to hurt their ability to compete.’ But actually I’m proud to say that the opposite has happened. Now, of course, we have set even higher standards.”

In the midst of the pandemic, new net-zero pledges, far more ambitious than those offered at Paris, were independently made by Japan, South Korea, the E.U., and, most significant, China, the world’s biggest emitter, which promised to reach an emissions peak by 2030 and get all the way to zero by 2060. China’s promise is so ambitious it has inspired one wave of debate among experts about whether it is even feasible — given that it would require, for instance, roughly twice as much renewable power to be installed every year for the next decade as Germany has operating nationwide today — and another debate about whether it has revived the possibility of that 1.5-degree target, with economic historian Adam Tooze writing, just after Xi Jinping’s surprise announcement in September, that it single-handedly “redefined the future prospects for humanity.” Together, the new net-zero pledges may have subtracted a full half-degree from ultimate warming. Add Biden’s campaign pledge of net zero by 2050, and you’ve got about two-thirds of global emissions at least nominally committed to firm, aggressive timelines to zero.

These are all just paper promises, of course, and the history of climate action is littered with the receipts of similar ones uncashed. Plot the growth of carbon concentration in the atmosphere against the sequence of climate-action conferences and a distressing pattern emerges: the World Meteorological Conference of 1979, the U.N. framework of 1992, the Kyoto protocol of 1997, the Copenhagen accord of 2009, and the 2015 Paris accords, all tracking an uninterrupted trajectory upward for carbon from a “safe” level under 350 parts per million, past 400, to 414 today, and pointing upward from there. Before the industrial revolution, humans had never known an atmosphere with even 300 parts per million. Inevitably now, within a few years, the concentration will reach levels not seen since 3.3 million years ago, when sea levels were 60 feet higher. For all their momentum, renewables still only make up 10 percent of global electricity production.

But alarmists have to take the good news where they find it. And while mood affiliation is not always the best guide to the state of the world, in 2020, for me, there were three main sources of hope.

The first is the fact that the age of climate denial is over thanks to extreme weather and the march of science and the historic labor of activists — climate strikers, Sunrise, Extinction Rebellion — whose success in raising alarm may have been so sudden that they brought an end to the age of climate Jeremiahs as well. Their voices now echo in some unlikely places. Exxon was booted from the S&P 500 within months of Tesla making Elon Musk the world’s richest man. The cultural cachet of oil companies is quickly approaching that of tobacco companies. Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil aside, practically every leader of every country and every major figure in every corporate and industrial sector now feels obligated — because of protest and social pressure, economic realities, and cultural expectation — to at least make a show of support for climate action. It would be nice not to have to count that as progress, but it is. The questions are: How much does it matter? And what will follow? Disinformation and human disregard are not the only instruments of delay, and the age of climate denial is likely to yield first not to an age of straightforward climate deliverance but to one characterized by climate hypocrisy, greenwashing, and gaslighting. But those things, ugly and maddening and even criminal as they are, have always been with us. It is the other thing that is new.

The second source of good news is the arrival on the global stage of climate self-interest. By this I don’t mean the profiteering logic of BlackRock, which opportunistically announced some half-hearted climate commitments last year, but rather the growing consensus in almost every part of the globe, and at almost every level of society and governance, that the world will be made better through decarbonization. A decade ago, many of the more ruthless capitalists to analyze that project deemed it too expensive to undertake. Today, it suddenly appears almost too good a deal to pass up. (A recent McKinsey [report](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/how-the-european-union-could-achieve-net-zero-emissions-at-net-zero-cost): “Net-Zero Emissions at Net-Zero Cost.”)

The logic may be clearest in considering the effects of air pollution, which kills an estimated 9 million people per year. In India, where more than 8 percent of GDP is lost to pollution, poor air quality is also responsible for 350,000 miscarriages and stillbirths every year. Globally, coal kills one person for every thousand people it provides power to, and even in the U.S., with its enviably clean air, total decarbonization would be entirely paid for, Duke’s Drew Shindell [recently testified](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths) before Congress, just through the public-health benefits of cutting out fossil fuels. You don’t even have to calculate any of the other returns — more jobs, cheaper energy, new infrastructure. Of course, countries all around the world are incorporating those considerations too, turning the page on a generation of economic analysis that said decarbonization was too costly and its benefits too small to sell to the public as upside.

A decade ago, capitalists deemed decarbonization too expensive. Suddenly, it appears too good a deal to pass up.

What is perhaps most striking about all the new climate pledges is not just that they were made in the absence of American leadership but that they were made outside the boundaries of the Paris framework. They are not the result of geopolitical strong-arming or “Kumbaya” consensus. They are, instead, plans arrived at internally, in some cases secretly. This has been eye-opening for the many skeptics who worried for decades about climate’s collective-action problem — who warned that because the benefits of decarbonization were distributed globally while the costs were concentrated locally, nations would move only if all of their peers did too. But a [recent paper](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/glep_a_00578) by Matto Mildenberger and Michaël Alkin suggests this shouldn’t be a surprise. In their retrospective analysis, they found that, despite much consternation about designing climate policy to prevent countries from “cheating,” there was basically no evidence of any country ever pulling back from mitigation efforts to take a free ride on the good-faith efforts of others. There was, in other words, no collective-action problem on climate after all. For a generation, the argument for climate action was made on a moral basis. That case has only grown stronger. And now there are other powerful, more mercenary arguments to offer.

The third cause for optimism is that, while the timelines to tolerably disruptive climate outcomes have already evaporated, the timelines to the next set of benchmarks is much more forgiving. This is why Glen Peters, the research director at the Cicero Center for International Climate Research, often jokes that while keeping warming below two degrees is very hard, perhaps even impossible, keeping it below 2.5 degrees now looks like a walk in the park.

This isn’t to say we’re on a glide path to safety. At current emissions levels, the planet will entirely exhaust the carbon budget for 1.5 degrees in just seven years — stay merely level, in other words, and we’ll burn through the possibility of a relatively comfortable endgame within the decade. We could buy ourselves a little more time by starting to move quickly, but not that much more. To decarbonize fast enough to give the planet a decent chance of hitting that 1.5-degree target without any negative emissions would require getting all the way to net-zero emissions by around 2035. Simply running the cars and furnaces and fossil-fuel infrastructure that already exists to its expected retirement date would push the world past 1.5 degrees—without a single new gasoline SUV hitting the road, or a single new oil-heated home being built, or a single new coal plant opened.

A two-degree target, by contrast, yields a much longer timeline, requiring the world to achieve net-zero by 2070 or 2080 — without even the help of negative emissions. We’d have to cut carbon production in half in about three decades, rather than one. That pathway will almost certainly prove harder than it looks. The good news is that we seem to be beginning, at least, to try.

#### Growth is sustainable---climate change is shifting economic incentives towards reducing emissions.

Henderson 20, John and Natty McArthur University Professor @ Harvard (Rebecca, May/June Issue, “The Unlikely Environmentalists: How the Private Sector Can Combat Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/unlikely-environmentalists)

There’s a reason climate change is often described as a “wicked problem.” Fully decarbonizing the economy will require not only completely transforming the global energy infrastructure, at a cost of many trillions of dollars, but also retrofitting all of the world’s buildings, remaking the planet’s agricultural practices, and revolutionizing transportation systems. It is difficult to see how this can be accomplished without some kind of global carbon tax or regulatory regime. But putting such a system in place is proving to be enormously difficult. The 2015 Paris agreement on climate change was a good first step, but many countries show little sign of meeting the commitments they made as part of that agreement, and the United States’ withdrawal from the process has presented a significant barrier to further progress. Given the slowing global economy and the slide toward populism and nationalism in much of the world, the prospects for any kind of comprehensive global accord seem increasingly remote. So far, at least, the public sector is failing to confront the problem. But the private sector has begun to step in to fill the vacuum. In January, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the world, declared that “climate risk is investment risk” and announced that going forward BlackRock would ask every firm in its portfolio to disclose its carbon emissions. BlackRock has roughly $7 trillion under management and is one of the largest shareholders in nearly every publicly traded firm in the world. So companies around the world paid attention when Fink went on to say that BlackRock would consider voting against boards whose firms “do not make sufficient progress” in addressing climate-related risks and would cease to invest altogether in some fossil fuel projects. Fink is not alone. Many of the world’s largest asset owners are coming to the conclusion that climate change is the most important risk to the long-term health of their portfolios. More than a third of global invested capital—about $19 trillion—is controlled by the world’s 100 largest asset owners. Nearly two-thirds of this money is in pension funds; the remaining third is in sovereign wealth funds. These funds are now so large that they are sometimes referred to as “universal owners” or “universal investors” since, in effect, they hold the entire market. For that reason, they cannot diversify away from the risk of climate change—a risk that Mark Carney, who until earlier this year was the governor of the Bank of England, suggested could result in an abrupt financial collapse, potentially wiping out as much as $20 trillion of assets. To avert that kind of calamity, major asset owners are starting to push the companies in their portfolios to address climate change. This trend is not driven by altruism or a deep commitment to the environment: it’s a function of economic interests. For the world’s largest asset owners, climate change is not an externality—it is a profound threat to their long-term returns. It will, after all, be significantly harder to make money in a world where most of the major ports are underwater, harvests are failing on a routine basis, and hundreds of millions of people are on the move. As more and more major asset owners come to this realization, it is creating increasingly strong incentives for them to cooperate with one another in support of large-scale decarbonization. Together, they are pressing the firms in their portfolios to set concrete targets for emission reductions and to make progress toward meeting those targets, potentially solving the problem posed by firms’ unwillingness to cut their emissions unless they can be assured that their competitors will follow suit. Someone, however, will need to monitor that progress and sanction firms that lag behind—a role that would be best filled by government regulators. The need for such public-sector involvement will likely increase private-sector support for the policy changes required to drastically reduce carbon emissions. In this way, private-sector pressure may serve as the force that finally breaks the political logjam that has long blocked the public action needed to solve the climate crisis. MONEY TALKS One of the most promising examples of what this might look like in practice is Climate Action 100+, a nonprofit affiliation of more than 300 investors who collectively control nearly half of the world’s invested capital. The group was founded in 2017 with the goal of persuading the world’s 100 largest private-sector carbon emitters to “cut the financial risk associated with catastrophe” by putting in place board-level processes to assess their climate-related risks and oversee plans for dealing with them, pledging to clearly disclose those risks, and taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across their value chains rapidly enough to help meet the Paris agreement’s goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below two degrees Celsius. In December 2018, a group of investors belonging to Climate Action 100+ published a letter in the Financial Times listing some specific steps they were demanding of companies in which they invest, including “the rapid elimination of coal use by utilities in EU and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries by no later than 2030.” Six months later, investors from the consortium pushed the oil giant Shell to announce short-term targets for limiting its greenhouse gas emissions and persuaded BP to support a shareholder resolution that binds the oil company to disclose the carbon intensity of its products, the methodology it uses to consider the climate impact of new investments, and its plans for setting and measuring emission targets. More than half of the 40 oil and gas companies with which the group has engaged have set long-term quantitative targets for reducing their emissions. And the group has helped persuade the shipping giant Maersk and two of the world’s largest mining companies, ArcelorMittal and Thyssenkrupp, to commit to becoming carbon neutral by 2050. These kinds of commitments are sometimes dismissed as mere greenwashing: public relations stunts designed to buy time. And sometimes they are. But they might also help catalyze an economic transformation that could play a major role in arresting climate change. Of course, large asset holders are not the only players who shape a company’s incentives: employees and consumers do, as well, and they are increasingly insisting that firms go green—and rewarding them when they do. For example, after the consumer goods giant Unilever announced that it planned to cut its carbon footprint in half and double its revenue at the same time—and then followed through by transforming its operations, brand by brand—the firm joined Facebook, Google, and Microsoft on LinkedIn’s list of the ten most desirable employers in the world. Sales of Unilever’s “sustainable living” brands—which include Ben & Jerry’s, Dove, and Vaseline and which Unilever claims “contribute to achieving the company’s ambition of halving its environmental footprint”—are growing 69 percent faster than the rest of the business and providing 75 percent of the company’s growth. Shifting public attitudes about climate change and public policies intended to combat it have also created clear business opportunities. Solar and wind energy are both multibillion-dollar businesses. The market for plant-based alternatives to meat is exploding. And global recycling could generate close to $400 billion in the next five years. RISKY BUSINESS But embracing the innovation that is required to exploit new opportunities is often risky and expensive. The venture capital industry lost at least $10 billion between 2005 and 2011 investing in clean energy technology. An electric utility that commits to phasing out coal plants might reap the benefits of declining solar and wind energy costs, but it could also misjudge the market and significantly increase its costs. An automobile company that invests in developing electric vehicles might leap ahead of its competitors, but it could also risk losing out to more cautious rivals. Universal investors can help mitigate those risks by funneling capital to firms that are willing to make the first move. This can be transformational in itself, since companies that decide to embrace new opportunities can often persuade an entire industry to follow them. Walmart’s massive investments in energy saving and waste reduction, for example, have helped persuade many other companies to take similar steps. Since 2010, the price of battery storage has fallen by at least 73 percent, a change driven largely by the electric vehicle company Tesla’s significant investments in the technology, which spurred the company’s competitors to invest more than $90 billion in the development of electric vehicles. Major asset holders can also push companies to commit to aggressive targets for decarbonizing their business models and insist that they report on their progress. In this way, universal investors may be able to force every firm in an industry to act, solving the collective action problem inherent in tackling climate change. Firms don’t naturally act collectively—for all kinds of reasons, including antitrust law. But when there exists a clear business case for doing so and cooperation can be credibly enforced, voluntary cooperation can be an effective means of creating or preserving public goods. Nearly half of the world’s inshore fisheries are managed through some form of cooperative agreement. Most of the rules governing international trade are designed and enforced by the International Chamber of Commerce, a voluntary association founded in 1919. Some of the world’s largest firms are increasingly exploring whether these kinds of voluntary agreements might be an effective way to reduce emissions. For example, after Unilever came under pressure from activists to stop using palm oil, the cultivation of which contributes to deforestation, Paul Polman, who was then the company’s CEO, was able to persuade many of his fellow consumer goods CEOs that continuing to purchase conventionally produced palm oil presented a significant threat to their own brands. Partly as a result, more than 60 percent of the world’s traded palm oil is now covered by sustainability commitments. Similar agreements with respect to soy and beef have greatly slowed rates of deforestation in the Amazon River basin. And companies in industries as diverse as airlines, food, retail, apparel, travel, hospitality, construction, health care, and high technology have begun to coordinate to reduce carbon emissions across supply chains, so that no single firm is placed at a disadvantage by going green. Such arrangements produce a wealth of knowledge about what effective decarbonization might look like on the ground. As one might expect, however, they are often unstable and difficult to enforce, since no mechanism exists through which to punish firms that drag their feet or refuse to conform. Here, universal investors might be able to make a significant difference by acting as enforcers. If BlackRock, for example, follows through on its threat to vote against the boards of companies that do not adequately disclose their climate emissions, every major firm in every industry will be forced to report—in an auditable, replicable way—the degree to which it is meeting its commitments. And if the world’s major investors then vote against the boards of those companies that are falling behind, investors could catalyze the transformation of entire industries. THE EARTH LOBBY Arresting climate change will still require government action, of course, and the changes afoot in finance and the corporate world could ease the path. As firms commit to reducing their carbon emissions, they are increasingly recognizing that the most effective way to ensure that they are not undercut by lagging companies is to press for regulation. Together, they are creating a constituency for effective climate policy. In 2017, for example, when U.S. President Donald Trump declared that he was going to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement, the CEOs of more than 50 U.S. companies, including Apple, Gap, Google, HP, and Levi Strauss, published an open letter urging him to rethink the decision. When Trump stuck to his plan, Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, and Bob Iger, then the CEO of Disney, resigned from some of the president’s advisory councils in protest. More than 2,000 companies have joined a collaborative effort called “We Are Still In,” a group working to ensure that the United States meets its commitments under the agreement despite the administration’s withdrawal. The group includes not only businesses but also states, cities, religious organizations, and universities. Together, they represent 68 percent of U.S. GDP, 65 percent of the U.S. population, and the source of more than half of all U.S. carbon emissions. Such action independent of the federal government could make a big difference. According to America’s Pledge, a nongovernmental organization that tracks local progress toward emission reductions, the “full achievement of already on-the-books policies from state and local actors—paired with rapidly shifting economics in the power sector—would reduce emissions 19 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and 25 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.” This would be a significant step toward the approximately 50 percent reduction in emissions that the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates is necessary to avoid the most dangerous potential outcomes of climate change. These efforts and others like them also have the potential to change the nature of the political conversation around climate change. In an increasingly partisan world, firms occupy a unique position. According to the 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, an annual survey measuring credibility and trust, business is now the world’s most trusted institution, and 71 percent of employees around the world agree that “it is critically important” for the CEOs of their companies “to respond to challenging times.” A broad-based movement among the world’s biggest companies to tackle climate change could help legitimate the idea that climate change is a real danger, that acting to avert it could be a major driver of innovation and economic growth, and that appropriate public policy could be enormously helpful. Such a movement could also put increasing pressure on companies that resist decarbonizing. One of the reasons that climate regulation has stalled in the United States is that a small minority of firms have invested billions of dollars in actively lobbying against it. If their peers start to push for regulation and highlight the dangers inherent in continuing with business as usual, those laggards will be compelled to change their behavior. One day soon, flooding the political process with money to defend the burning of fossil fuels could be seen as an unacceptable reputational risk—or even as morally indefensible. For many years, experts have assumed that the fastest and most efficient route to global decarbonization is coordinated state action. But as the world’s political institutions have come under pressure, such action has become increasingly elusive. Against this background, the growing understanding that climate change presents a profound threat to the long-term returns of the world’s largest asset owners provides some reason for hope. As investors push for change and the realization dawns in more and more boardrooms that the benefits of climate action will outweigh the costs, it is possible that leading-edge firms could trigger a cascade of reinforcing reforms, transforming the economics of individual industries and creating a significant constituency for political action. For decades, when it came to addressing climate change, large asset holders and big companies acted more as obstacles than as catalysts. Those days may soon be over.

# 2NC

## T

### AT CI---USFG

#### USFG is the three branches---explicitly distinct from the people.

US Legal (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition. https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

### AT CI---Resolved

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

# 1NR

## DA---CAPITALISM

### 1NR---AT Caldera

#### Cap increases stability and disincentivizes conflict and expansionism.

Szayna et al. 17, Research department director of the Defense and Political Sciences Department and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He has over 30 years of experience in national security policy and defense analysis. From 1997 to 2011 he served as associate director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program in RAND's Army Research Division. His research has focused on aspects of strategic planning for the U.S. armed forces, post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, and coalition interoperability. He gave testimony for the U.S. House of Representatives and has been a keynote speaker at a number of defense conferences. Szayna received a B.A. in history and philosophy from Villanova University and an M.A. in international relations from Claremont Graduate School. Also Angela O’Mahony, Jennifer Kavanagh, Stephen Watts, Bryan Frederick, Tova C. Norlen, Phoenix Voorhies. (“Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections”. 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RR1063.html)

There are a number of factors that could lead to discontinuous changes in this metric. For example, a global economic downturn could lead to sharp reductions in development aid that could threaten any improvements in governance that had been made with the benefit of that assistance. Alternatively, a major jump in global energy costs could induce widespread fiscal crises similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s, ultimately leading to reduced state capacity. The branch scenario in red projects essentially no improvements in state capacity over the period in question, so larger changes would entail the rapid erosion of the capacity of states that are already relatively capable. Such changes are certainly possible, but they would constitute an example of nonlinear disruptive change. On balance, our projection is that state capacity is likely to continue to improve, which will tend to exert a downward pressure on the likelihood of intrastate conflict. Prevalence of Consolidated Democracies Consolidated democracies are less likely to fight one another and to be involved in internal conflict. While this correlation is clear, the mechanism by which democracies reduce conflict is more contested. The literature on interstate conflict has focused on the greater transparency and consistency of democratic regimes that allow them to credibly commit to peaceful solutions to disputes and the possibility that domestic norms and greater political accountability may make democratic states less likely to pursue violent conflicts.8 There are fewer arguments that the greater ability of consolidated democracies to resolve grievances within the political system leads to less intrastate conflict.9 We note, however, that partial democracies or the process of democratization itself may not be particularly peaceful and may even be associated with an increase in conflict.10 Given the importance of consolidated democracy in the literature on conflict, there is already a great deal of work in the academic literature on measurement of democracy. Several aggregate measures of democracy have been developed that include the competitiveness of elections; the state’s respect for civil, political, and minority rights; and freedoms of the press and religion. The most widely used measure of consolidated democracy, and the one we employ, comes from the Polity project. By coding a wide range of regime characteristics, such as political 8 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale University Press, 1984; Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996; Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. 9 Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 33–48; Christian Davenport, State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace, New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 10 Hegre et al., 2001; Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug, “Elections and Ethnic Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2012, pp. 387–417. 49 competition and constraints on the executive, an aggregate “Polity score” is produced, ranging from –10 to 10. Values of 6 or higher are typically used to identify the presence of a democracy, with a more conservative measurement of 8 or higher often used to identify consolidated democracies. We use this metric to calculate the percentage of all states that are consolidated democracies, with the historical values denoted by the black line in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2. Prevalence of Consolidated Democracies SOURCE: Historical data: Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Data Set [Computer file; version p4v2012], College Park, Md.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2002; projections calculated by authors. We projected the baseline scenario by fitting a trend line to the historical data and calculating the future values.11 This projection is represented in the figure by the gray line. We calculated the two branch scenarios as one standard deviation above and below the baseline projection; they are shown in the figure by the blue and red lines, respectively. Discontinuous growth in the prevalence of democracies could result from various tippingpoint effects. If a high percentage of the world’s population were governed through democracy, other forms of government may come to be seen as illegitimate, and greater international pressure may be brought to bear to remove them. Within the time frame of our study, a dramatic reversal in the prevalence of consolidated democracies appears to be less likely. The reversion of 11 The trend line was fit using a generalized linear model linked to a binomial logit function. The resulting projections are therefore bounded between 0 and 1 (in this case, 0 and 100 percent). The model used in Figure 3.2 has a Pearson statistic (1/df) of .0037, suggesting a high degree of fit with the data. 50 consolidated democracies to autocracies historically has been extremely rare and is unlikely in the absence of extreme economic decline, the conquest of democracies by more powerful autocracies, or both. Either of these potential paths is likely to lead directly to increases in future conflict levels as well. Degree of Ethnic and Sectarian Polarization The academic literature generally agrees that a high level of ethnic and sectarian polarization is not sufficient by itself to cause conflict either within or between states. However, there is also agreement that in the intrastate context, where group mobilization occurs along ethnic lines, identity can become a significant contributing factor for violence, especially when strengthened by socioeconomic and sociopolitical grievances. Consequently, we identified the degree of ethnic and sectarian polarization as one of the primary factors likely to affect the level of intrastate conflict in the future. Evidence also shows that while ethnicity may not lead to conflict by itself, it may work to prolong conflicts and increase the intensity of violence in those conflicts that are already occurring.12 Such effects will most likely be strengthened if ethnic groups are deliberately disadvantaged by the state or if they are territorially based and have secessionist or separatist demands.13 Scholars tend to agree that ethnic and sectarian polarization, while a strong predictor for increased levels of intrastate conflict, is not a strong driver for conflicts between states. However, if regional and international actors become involved in intrastate conflicts, or if conflicts spread across borders, such polarization could also affect levels of interstate conflict. Such a scenario is especially likely where ethnic kin-groups in neighboring states become involved with secessionist movements.14 Quantifying ethnic and sectarian polarization is inherently difficult. While various measures have been tried, such as linguistic differences (e.g., ethno-linguistic fractionalization) or religious preferences, they are often criticized for not capturing the cleavage that gives rise to political mobilization. For example, different ethnic groups may share the same religion, and one ethnic group may speak multiple languages. It can also be difficult to determine when certain identities in a society are increasing in salience, and when they are becoming less relevant. One prominent 12 Rajat Ganguly and Raymond Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, Longman Publishers, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 50, No. 11, 2007. 13 Gurr, 1970; Stephen M. Saideman, and William R. Ayres, “Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 4, November 2000, pp. 1126–1144; Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. 14 John A. Vasquez, and Brendan Valeriano, “Territory as a Source of Conflict and a Road to Peace,” in Jacob Bercovitch, Viktor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE, 2009, pp. 193–209. 51 attempt to quantify relevant ethnic identities is the Minorities at Risk data set at the University of Maryland, which identifies minority groups by their “at risk” status—that is, by the extent to which they are disadvantaged in their relationships with other groups in the state in which they reside. However, the Minorities at Risk data identify such “at risk” groups somewhat subjectively, and the project does not claim to be comprehensive. An alternative, objective measure is to look for the degree of formal discrimination against ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups. The creation or removal of official laws providing for formal discrimination can help to identify states where identity-based grievances may become more or less salient. For capturing the degree of ethnic and sectarian polarization, therefore, we looked at the percentage of states with formal discrimination against minorities, where such minority groups make up at least 5 percent of the state’s population. We used the Ethnic Power Relations data set (EPR), which tracks the extent of access to state power for all politically relevant ethnic groups in every country of the world from 1946 to 2013. It includes annual data on more than 733 groups and codes the degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government to being formally barred from holding political office. While the disadvantage of such a proxy may be that it potentially fails to capture some of the unofficial social discrimination that can lead to group mobilization, the advantage is that it allows for a more objective measure of sectarian tension. The overall levels of ethnic or sectarian polarization in the figure below may therefore be understated, but we can have more confidence in the general trend line than we could with more subjective data sources. We projected the baseline scenario by fitting an exponential trend line to the available historical data and calculating the future values.15 The projection is shown by a gray line in Figure 3.3. We calculated the two branch scenarios as one standard deviation above and below the baseline projection; they are shown by a red and blue line, respectively. 15 The exponential trend line fit to the data has the equation: y = 0.3098e-0.012x. The trend line has a high degree of fit with the data, with an R² of 0.85. 52 Figure 3.3. Percentage of States with Discriminated Minorities SOURCE: Historical data: Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data set,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, 2009, pp. 316–337; projections calculated by authors. Discontinuous change in this variable may occur as a result of several factors. Historically, ethnic and sectarian factors often have increased in relevance after the breakup of larger states and empires, including the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, or the end of colonialism in the 1960s. The breakup of other large, multiethnic states in the future could result in a similar outcome. Extremely high levels of resource stress because of population pressures also could prompt increased ethnically based conflict within states. Ethnic and sectarian polarization and grievances are latent in many societies, and may become politically important in order to mobilize groups to violence under conditions of severe resource or economic privation. Rate of Economic Growth Economic growth affects the prevalence of conflict in several ways. While territorial expansion traditionally has been a major cause of interstate war, states with higher levels of economic development may be less motivated to pursue such expansion because of the lower relative value of land inputs in an industrialized economy. Moreover, their reliance on international capital markets may increase the potential costs of disruptions from serious 53 international crises.16 At the intrastate level, economic growth (if broadly shared) reduces grievances, bolsters the capacity of the state to handle security challenges, and increases the population’s opportunities for licit employment, thus raising the opportunity costs of participating in rebellions or insurgencies.17 Growth benefits that accrue along ethnic or sectarian lines, however, might increase the potential for intrastate conflict, as discussed in the previous section, and sharp declines in the rate of economic growth could be associated with an increased risk of internal conflict as well.18 Therefore, there are at least two different concepts that any operationalization of this factor should attempt to capture: the overall level of economic development and changes in the rate of economic growth. Over the short term, wealthy countries tend to remain wealthy and poor countries tend to remain poor, and their degree of wealth may have a strong effect on their overall likelihood of being involved in conflict. In addition, sharp declines in the rate of growth for a range of states may increase their likelihood of intrastate conflict in particular.

#### Disrupting the economy won’t end capitalism BUT will unravel interdependence. Great-power war.

Oppenheimer 21, MA, Clinical Professor and leads the IR Futures concentration @ the Center for Global Affairs, School of Professional Studies, New York University. (Michael F., “The Turbulent Future of International Relations”, *The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction*, pg. 28-30, Palgrave Macmillan)

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro-Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19

Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:

We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20

The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre-World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present:

Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war.

We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago.

…In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports.

…The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars.

In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable.

…the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.

### 1NR---AT Trainer

#### Trainer agree’s

Trainer 16

Ted Trainer, Ted Trainer is an Australian academic, and an advocate of economic de-growth, simple living, and 'conserver' lifestyles with a PHD from the University of Sydney and is a prolific author of several novels, 2/26/2016 (<http://thesimplerway.info/TRANSITION.htm>, “HOW MIGHT WE MAKE THE TRANSITION TO THE SIMPLER WAY?”, Accessed 7/21/17)//DG

As local economic self-sufficiency develops communities will become more aware of their limits, especially their need for inputs from the global economy. Towns will need chicken wire, polypipe, 12 volt pumps, shovels, which they cannot produce in their towns. This will prompt the realization that the wider national economy must be massively restructured so that its function becomes providing all towns and suburbs with the inputs they need. This is the crucial mechanism that will generate the mass pressure for transition to a very different kind of national economy and a very different kind of “state”, i.e., one that isunder the control of local assemblies. It can only come into existence after a long period in which local economies develop. The order of events here is crucial; change at the level of the state cannot come first, and it is the development of localism which will build support for change at the wider level. (Discussed further below re “eco-anarchism”.)

This means that the last thing we want is a sudden collapse of the economy. If that happens all is lost because our capacity to build the new communities depends on being able to get crucial inputs from the existing economy for the purpose. It will be an extremely difficult and uncertain process like stepping from a sinking boat onto another being built from planks taken from the one going down. We can’t built the new without drawing from the old one, but that will damage the old one because the more that people move out of the old economy the lower demand and economic activity within it will become and the more it will lurch into depression, paralysis and chaos. Will firms producing chicken wire and watering cans be able to survive as sales of most of their output decrease markedly? Will we be able to create enough alternative settlements and sources of livelihood as the numbers coming across from the shrinking old economy rise?

But we will probably not get to Stage 2 for a long time. The main implication is that here and now it is a mistake to concern ourselves with directly fighting against the system or trying to get control of the state. What matters is developing the widespread awareness that will in time lead to demand for Stage 2 changes, and this is best done by plunging into the kinds of activities going on in Transition Towns … in order to try to get people there to see that eventually we must deal with the Stage 2 problem. The revolution cannot get anywhere until there is widespread demand for it so our task for a long time yet will be to build that radically critical support, and the argument here is that the best arena in which to work for that is within current localism initiatives. (There are other things to do, especially writing and distributing critical analyses.)

#### Growth is sustainable and solves climate—corporate self-restraint

Henderson 20, John and Natty McArthur University Professor @ Harvard (Rebecca, May/June Issue, “The Unlikely Environmentalists: How the Private Sector Can Combat Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/unlikely-environmentalists)

There’s a reason climate change is often described as a “wicked problem.” Fully decarbonizing the economy will require not only completely transforming the global energy infrastructure, at a cost of many trillions of dollars, but also retrofitting all of the world’s buildings, remaking the planet’s agricultural practices, and revolutionizing transportation systems. It is difficult to see how this can be accomplished without some kind of global carbon tax or regulatory regime. But putting such a system in place is proving to be enormously difficult. The 2015 Paris agreement on climate change was a good first step, but many countries show little sign of meeting the commitments they made as part of that agreement, and the United States’ withdrawal from the process has presented a significant barrier to further progress. Given the slowing global economy and the slide toward populism and nationalism in much of the world, the prospects for any kind of comprehensive global accord seem increasingly remote. So far, at least, the public sector is failing to confront the problem.

But the private sector has begun to step in to fill the vacuum. In January, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the world, declared that “climate risk is investment risk” and announced that going forward BlackRock would ask every firm in its portfolio to disclose its carbon emissions. BlackRock has roughly $7 trillion under management and is one of the largest shareholders in nearly every publicly traded firm in the world. So companies around the world paid attention when Fink went on to say that BlackRock would consider voting against boards whose firms “do not make sufficient progress” in addressing climate-related risks and would cease to invest altogether in some fossil fuel projects.

Fink is not alone. Many of the world’s largest asset owners are coming to the conclusion that climate change is the most important risk to the long-term health of their portfolios. More than a third of global invested capital—about $19 trillion—is controlled by the world’s 100 largest asset owners. Nearly two-thirds of this money is in pension funds; the remaining third is in sovereign wealth funds. These funds are now so large that they are sometimes referred to as “universal owners” or “universal investors” since, in effect, they hold the entire market. For that reason, they cannot diversify away from the risk of climate change—a risk that Mark Carney, who until earlier this year was the governor of the Bank of England, suggested could result in an abrupt financial collapse, potentially wiping out as much as $20 trillion of assets. To avert that kind of calamity, major asset owners are starting to push the companies in their portfolios to address climate change.

This trend is not driven by altruism or a deep commitment to the environment: it’s a function of economic interests. For the world’s largest asset owners, climate change is not an externality—it is a profound threat to their long-term returns. It will, after all, be significantly harder to make money in a world where most of the major ports are underwater, harvests are failing on a routine basis, and hundreds of millions of people are on the move.

As more and more major asset owners come to this realization, it is creating increasingly strong incentives for them to cooperate with one another in support of large-scale decarbonization. Together, they are pressing the firms in their portfolios to set concrete targets for emission reductions and to make progress toward meeting those targets, potentially solving the problem posed by firms’ unwillingness to cut their emissions unless they can be assured that their competitors will follow suit. Someone, however, will need to monitor that progress and sanction firms that lag behind—a role that would be best filled by government regulators. The need for such public-sector involvement will likely increase private-sector support for the policy changes required to drastically reduce carbon emissions. In this way, private-sector pressure may serve as the force that finally breaks the political logjam that has long blocked the public action needed to solve the climate crisis.

MONEY TALKS

One of the most promising examples of what this might look like in practice is Climate Action 100+, a nonprofit affiliation of more than 300 investors who collectively control nearly half of the world’s invested capital. The group was founded in 2017 with the goal of persuading the world’s 100 largest private-sector carbon emitters to “cut the financial risk associated with catastrophe” by putting in place board-level processes to assess their climate-related risks and oversee plans for dealing with them, pledging to clearly disclose those risks, and taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across their value chains rapidly enough to help meet the Paris agreement’s goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below two degrees Celsius.

In December 2018, a group of investors belonging to Climate Action 100+ published a letter in the Financial Times listing some specific steps they were demanding of companies in which they invest, including “the rapid elimination of coal use by utilities in EU and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries by no later than 2030.” Six months later, investors from the consortium pushed the oil giant Shell to announce short-term targets for limiting its greenhouse gas emissions and persuaded BP to support a shareholder resolution that binds the oil company to disclose the carbon intensity of its products, the methodology it uses to consider the climate impact of new investments, and its plans for setting and measuring emission targets. More than half of the 40 oil and gas companies with which the group has engaged have set long-term quantitative targets for reducing their emissions. And the group has helped persuade the shipping giant Maersk and two of the world’s largest mining companies, ArcelorMittal and Thyssenkrupp, to commit to becoming carbon neutral by 2050.

These kinds of commitments are sometimes dismissed as mere greenwashing: public relations stunts designed to buy time. And sometimes they are. But they might also help catalyze an economic transformation that could play a major role in arresting climate change.

Of course, large asset holders are not the only players who shape a company’s incentives: employees and consumers do, as well, and they are increasingly insisting that firms go green—and rewarding them when they do. For example, after the consumer goods giant Unilever announced that it planned to cut its carbon footprint in half and double its revenue at the same time—and then followed through by transforming its operations, brand by brand—the firm joined Facebook, Google, and Microsoft on LinkedIn’s list of the ten most desirable employers in the world. Sales of Unilever’s “sustainable living” brands—which include Ben & Jerry’s, Dove, and Vaseline and which Unilever claims “contribute to achieving the company’s ambition of halving its environmental footprint”—are growing 69 percent faster than the rest of the business and providing 75 percent of the company’s growth.

Shifting public attitudes about climate change and public policies intended to combat it have also created clear business opportunities. Solar and wind energy are both multibillion-dollar businesses. The market for plant-based alternatives to meat is exploding. And global recycling could generate close to $400 billion in the next five years.

RISKY BUSINESS

But embracing the innovation that is required to exploit new opportunities is often risky and expensive. The venture capital industry lost at least $10 billion between 2005 and 2011 investing in clean energy technology. An electric utility that commits to phasing out coal plants might reap the benefits of declining solar and wind energy costs, but it could also misjudge the market and significantly increase its costs. An automobile company that invests in developing electric vehicles might leap ahead of its competitors, but it could also risk losing out to more cautious rivals.

Universal investors can help mitigate those risks by funneling capital to firms that are willing to make the first move. This can be transformational in itself, since companies that decide to embrace new opportunities can often persuade an entire industry to follow them. Walmart’s massive investments in energy saving and waste reduction, for example, have helped persuade many other companies to take similar steps. Since 2010, the price of battery storage has fallen by at least 73 percent, a change driven largely by the electric vehicle company Tesla’s significant investments in the technology, which spurred the company’s competitors to invest more than $90 billion in the development of electric vehicles.

Major asset holders can also push companies to commit to aggressive targets for decarbonizing their business models and insist that they report on their progress. In this way, universal investors may be able to force every firm in an industry to act, solving the collective action problem inherent in tackling climate change. Firms don’t naturally act collectively—for all kinds of reasons, including antitrust law. But when there exists a clear business case for doing so and cooperation can be credibly enforced, voluntary cooperation can be an effective means of creating or preserving public goods. Nearly half of the world’s inshore fisheries are managed through some form of cooperative agreement. Most of the rules governing international trade are designed and enforced by the International Chamber of Commerce, a voluntary association founded in 1919.

Some of the world’s largest firms are increasingly exploring whether these kinds of voluntary agreements might be an effective way to reduce emissions. For example, after Unilever came under pressure from activists to stop using palm oil, the cultivation of which contributes to deforestation, Paul Polman, who was then the company’s CEO, was able to persuade many of his fellow consumer goods CEOs that continuing to purchase conventionally produced palm oil presented a significant threat to their own brands. Partly as a result, more than 60 percent of the world’s traded palm oil is now covered by sustainability commitments. Similar agreements with respect to soy and beef have greatly slowed rates of deforestation in the Amazon River basin. And companies in industries as diverse as airlines, food, retail, apparel, travel, hospitality, construction, health care, and high technology have begun to coordinate to reduce carbon emissions across supply chains, so that no single firm is placed at a disadvantage by going green.

Such arrangements produce a wealth of knowledge about what effective decarbonization might look like on the ground. As one might expect, however, they are often unstable and difficult to enforce, since no mechanism exists through which to punish firms that drag their feet or refuse to conform. Here, universal investors might be able to make a significant difference by acting as enforcers. If BlackRock, for example, follows through on its threat to vote against the boards of companies that do not adequately disclose their climate emissions, every major firm in every industry will be forced to report—in an auditable, replicable way—the degree to which it is meeting its commitments. And if the world’s major investors then vote against the boards of those companies that are falling behind, investors could catalyze the transformation of entire industries.

THE EARTH LOBBY

Arresting climate change will still require government action, of course, and the changes afoot in finance and the corporate world could ease the path. As firms commit to reducing their carbon emissions, they are increasingly recognizing that the most effective way to ensure that they are not undercut by lagging companies is to press for regulation. Together, they are creating a constituency for effective climate policy.

In 2017, for example, when U.S. President Donald Trump declared that he was going to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement, the CEOs of more than 50 U.S. companies, including Apple, Gap, Google, HP, and Levi Strauss, published an open letter urging him to rethink the decision. When Trump stuck to his plan, Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, and Bob Iger, then the CEO of Disney, resigned from some of the president’s advisory councils in protest. More than 2,000 companies have joined a collaborative effort called “We Are Still In,” a group working to ensure that the United States meets its commitments under the agreement despite the administration’s withdrawal. The group includes not only businesses but also states, cities, religious organizations, and universities. Together, they represent 68 percent of U.S. GDP, 65 percent of the U.S. population, and the source of more than half of all U.S. carbon emissions. Such action independent of the federal government could make a big difference. According to America’s Pledge, a nongovernmental organization that tracks local progress toward emission reductions, the “full achievement of already on-the-books policies from state and local actors—paired with rapidly shifting economics in the power sector—would reduce emissions 19 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and 25 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.” This would be a significant step toward the approximately 50 percent reduction in emissions that the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates is necessary to avoid the most dangerous potential outcomes of climate change.

These efforts and others like them also have the potential to change the nature of the political conversation around climate change. In an increasingly partisan world, firms occupy a unique position. According to the 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, an annual survey measuring credibility and trust, business is now the world’s most trusted institution, and 71 percent of employees around the world agree that “it is critically important” for the CEOs of their companies “to respond to challenging times.” A broad-based movement among the world’s biggest companies to tackle climate change could help legitimate the idea that climate change is a real danger, that acting to avert it could be a major driver of innovation and economic growth, and that appropriate public policy could be enormously helpful.

Such a movement could also put increasing pressure on companies that resist decarbonizing. One of the reasons that climate regulation has stalled in the United States is that a small minority of firms have invested billions of dollars in actively lobbying against it. If their peers start to push for regulation and highlight the dangers inherent in continuing with business as usual, those laggards will be compelled to change their behavior. One day soon, flooding the political process with money to defend the burning of fossil fuels could be seen as an unacceptable reputational risk—or even as morally indefensible.

For many years, experts have assumed that the fastest and most efficient route to global decarbonization is coordinated state action. But as the world’s political institutions have come under pressure, such action has become increasingly elusive. Against this background, the growing understanding that climate change presents a profound threat to the long-term returns of the world’s largest asset owners provides some reason for hope. As investors push for change and the realization dawns in more and more boardrooms that the benefits of climate action will outweigh the costs, it is possible that leading-edge firms could trigger a cascade of reinforcing reforms, transforming the economics of individual industries and creating a significant constituency for political action. For decades, when it came to addressing climate change, large asset holders and big companies acted more as obstacles than as catalysts. Those days may soon be over.

### 1NC #3---Food DA

#### Food wars- escalate go nuclear

FDI 12 (Future Directions International, “International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme”, May 25, <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Workshop_Report_-_Intl_Conflict_Triggers_-_May_25.pdf>)

There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.